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1 Introduction
People have limited cognitive abilities and are prone to various behavioral biases;
this is documented by ample evidence in the literature of marketing, psychology, and
behavioral economics. Thus, it is not surprising that the behavior of individuals may
not be consistent with the standard axioms of rationality.1,2 What shall a planner do if
he/she wants to implement a goal when the relevant information is distributed among
“predictably irrational” individuals?
The present paper provides an analysis of the theory of implementation under incom-
plete information when individuals’ choices do not necessarily comply with the standard
axioms of rationality. That is, our paper is the incomplete information counterpart of
de Clippel (2014), which provides an analysis for the case of complete information. Our
results provide an important leap in behavioral implementation as information asymme-
tries are inescapable in many economic settings.
In particular, we analyze the problem of designing a mechanism under incomplete
information when individuals are allowed to display any type of behavioral biases, such as
falling for an attraction effect, displaying a status-quo bias or revealing cyclic preferences
(as is the case when groups act as an individual), among many others. In doing so, we
focus on full implementation and employ ex-post equilibrium (hereafter, abbreviated to
EPE) as our main concept of equilibrium for the following reasons.
Full implementation of a predetermined social choice rule requires that the set of
equilibrium outcomes of the associated mechanism fully coincide with the given social
choice rule. On the other hand, partial implementation only requires that the prede-
1This is why the recent trend involving the use of behavioral insights in policy-making has been
growing stronger, implying an increased interest in adapting economic models to allow behavioral biases.
In particular, Thaler and Sunstein’s New York Times best-seller book Nudge has been influential guiding
real life policies. For instance, the Behavioral Insights Team, a.k.a. the Nudge Unit, has been established
in 2010 in the United Kingdom. In the United States, President Obama released an executive order
in 2015, emphasizing the importance of behavioral insights to deliver better policy outcomes at lower
costs and at the same time encouraging executive departments and agencies to incorporate these insights
into policy-making. Many countries and international institutions followed, there are now more than
a dozen countries besides EU, OECD, UN agencies, and the World Bank that integrated behavioral
insights into their operations (Afif, 2017). There is such a trend in the academic literature as well, e.g.,
Spiegler (2011) provides a synthesis of efforts to adapt models in industrial organization to bounded
rationality.
2We say that individuals’ choices satisfy the standard axioms of rationality whenever their choices
obey the weak axiom of revealed preferences, which is formalized in Footnote 12. Besides Nudge (Thaler
& Sunstein, 2008), two other New York Times best-seller books documenting various behavioral biases
leading to failure of the standard axioms of rationality are Predictably Irrational (Ariely, 2009) and
Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman, 2011).
1
termined social choice rule be sustained by an equilibrium of the mechanism; hence, it
allows for other equilibria associated with outcomes that are not aligned with the social
goal at hand. Even though it is weaker than full implementation, partial implemen-
tation is rather widely used in the rational domain under incomplete information. In
fact, the appeal of partial implementation depends heavily on the revelation principle,
which implies, in the rational domain and under incomplete information, the follow-
ing: if there exists a particular mechanism that partially implements a predetermined
goal, then there exists a direct revelation mechanism that truthfully implements it.3
The undesired equilibria are then often disregarded on the basis of the equilibrium with
truthful revelation being the salient equilibrium. This is pointed out in Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1986) as follows:
[The partial (direct revelation) implementation] does assure that the re-
sulting outcome will be an equilibrium of some game; however, there may
be others as well. This problem is sometimes dismissed with an argument
that as long as truthful revelation is an equilibrium, it will somehow be the
salient equilibrium even if there are other equilibria as well.
In our environment, we show that the revelation principle fails and the above argu-
ment loses its relevance, implying that partial implementation loses its practical appeal:
One cannot restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms without a loss of gener-
ality. This is why focusing on full implementation rather than partial implementation
becomes crucial in our setup.
The concept of EPE, the notion of equilibrium of the current paper, is well-suited to
our environment: it is belief-free, does not require any belief updating or any expectation
considerations, and is robust to informational assumptions regarding the environment.
On the other hand, the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not suited to our
setup. This is because the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium employs an aggregation
of individuals’ welfare in different states of the world using the associated probabilities.
At the very least, this necessitates the need for complete and transitive preferences over
the set of certain outcomes in order to obtain a utility representation. However, this
is neither coherent nor consistent in a setting in which individuals’ choices over certain
outcomes (alternatively, degenerate acts) do not necessarily obey the standard axioms
of rationality. Indeed, in our environment, individuals’ choices over certain outcomes
may not even be representable by well-defined preference relations.4
3A direct revelation mechanism is a game-form in which each individual’s actions consist of a report
about his/her own privately observed type.
4Please see Footnote 20 for further details.
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We provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for ex-post implementation when
individuals’ choices need not satisfy the standard axioms of rationality.
Our first result on necessity, Theorem 1, shows that if a mechanism ex-post imple-
ments a social choice set (SCS, hereafter), then the opportunity sets sustained by this
mechanism form a collection of sets with two desirable properties.5,6 The first of these
implies an ex-post choice monotonicity condition (shown in Proposition 1), while the
second implies a pseudo ex-post incentive compatibility (established in Proposition 2).7
An important implication of our result on necessity is that the revelation principle
holds whenever individuals’ choices satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
We provide sufficiency results for the case of three or more individuals and the case
of two individuals, separately. With three or more individuals, we present two meth-
ods to strengthen our necessary conditions to deliver sufficiency: The first, presented
in Theorem 2, involves choice incompatibility, a mild condition that requires some level
of disagreement among the individuals at every state, and it performs a similar task
as that done by the economic environment assumption in the rational domain.8 Theo-
rem 3 presents the second method in which we employ a combination of our necessary
conditions and a choice counterpart of the no-veto-power property.
The mechanism we employ in the case of two individuals is novel as it features
differences when compared with its counterparts in the rational domain. Furthermore,
we provide two routes to strengthen the associated necessary conditions into sufficient
conditions. These, presented in Theorems 5 and 6, require either some sort of choice
5The opportunity set of an individual consists of the alternatives that he/she can obtain by changing
his/her messages, while those of the opponents remain the same.
6We refer to such family of sets as the collection of sets consistent with the given SCS under incom-
plete information. Each member of this collection of sets is associated with an individual and a social
choice function (SCF) in the SCS and a type profile of the other individuals with the property that
each such set is independent of the message (in the mechanism) chosen by the individual whom this
set is associated with. Moreover the following hold: (1) Given any individual and any one of his/her
particular types and any SCF in the SCS and any type profile for the other individuals, it must be that
the individual’s choices under the resulting type profile contain the alternative that corresponds to the
outcome of the SCF for the same type profile; and (2) whenever there is a deception that leads to an
outcome that is not compatible with the SCS, there exist an informant state (i.e., a type profile) and
an informant individual such that this individual does not choose at the informant state the alternative
generated by this deception from his/her set given that he/she is as in the informant state while others’
types are identified via their deception from the informant state.
7It is useful to point out that the pseudo ex-post incentive compatibility is a result of item (1) of
Footnote 6, while item (2) of the same footnote implies our ex-post choice monotonicity condition.
8The choice incompatibility required for sufficiency is satisfied when there exist a set of alternatives
and a collection of choice sets described as in the necessity direction with the following two properties:
(1) this set of alternatives contains the union of the collection of choice sets; and (2) for each alternative
in this set, there exist at least two individuals who do not choose that alternative from this set.
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incompatibility or some sort of choice unanimity.
Another contribution of our paper concerns the simplicity of the mechanisms needed
for implementation, a topic of recent interest [see e.g., Li (2017) and Borgers and Li
(2018)]. Naturally, simplicity becomes a bigger concern when dealing with individuals
having cognitive limitations. In Theorem 7, we identify lower bounds on the number of
messages that is required from a mechanism that ex-post implements a given SCS. Our
result, therefore, provides a better understanding of the scope of a well-known criticism
of the mechanism design literature, which involves the argument that, often, mechanisms
employed are complicated and thus do not offer much practical appeal.
In Section 2, we discuss some related literature. Section 3 presents a motivating
example illustrating the difficulties associated with the desired construction. In Section
4, we provide the notation and the definitions. Section 5 contains the necessity and
sufficiency results concerning the case with three or more individuals, while Section 6
contains the same for the case with two individuals. In Section 7, we discuss simple
mechanisms and present lower bounds on the number of messages needed, and Section
8 concludes. Meanwhile, the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Besides de Clippel (2014), our paper is mostly related to Bergemann and Morris
(2008), which analyzes ex-post implementation in the rational domain.9 In a sense, our
paper can be thought of as an envelope of de Clippel (2014) and Bergemann and Morris
(2008). We extend de Clippel (2014)’s analysis to the case of incomplete information
and Bergemann and Morris (2008)’s analysis to the case where individual choices’ need
not satisfy the standard axioms of rationality. A difference of note is that we provide
a novel analysis for the case of two individuals in our setup, whereas Bergemann and
Morris (2008) provides their analysis only for the case of three or more individuals. On
the other hand, de Clippel (2014) discusses a modification of his sufficiency results in
order to obtain sufficiency for the case of two individuals, and it involves the use of an
argument similar to the one from Moore and Repullo (1990).
Another related paper is Jackson (1991), which analyzes Bayesian implementation for
the case of three or more individuals in the rational domain. Jackson (1991) generalizes
the analysis of Maskin (1999) (on Nash implementation under complete information) to
9Some of the other influential work on ex-post implementation and robust mechanism design in the
rational domain include Bergemann and Morris (2005), Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame
(2006), Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, and Moldovanu (2008), and Bergemann and Morris (2009).
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the case of incomplete information. In this sense, what Jackson (1991) is to the seminal
work in Maskin (1999), our paper is to de Clippel (2014).10
Hurwicz (1986), Korpela (2012), and Ray (2018) have also investigated the problem
of implementation under complete information when individual choices do not have to
satisfy the standard axioms of rationality. Hurwicz (1986) considers choices that can
be represented by a well-defined preference relation which does not have to be acyclic.
On the other hand, Korpela (2012) shows that when individual choices fail rationality
axioms, independence of irrelevant alternatives, also known as Sen’s α, is key to obtaining
the necessary and sufficient condition synonymous to that of Moore and Repullo (1990)
(the so-called Condition µ) under complete information.
There have been other attempts at investigating the problem of implementation un-
der complete information that allow for “non-rational” behavior of individuals. Eliaz
(2002) provides an analysis of implementation when some of the individuals might be
“faulty” and hence fail to act optimally. An earlier paper of ours, Barlo and Dalkiran
(2009), provides an analysis of implementation for the case of epsilon-Nash equilibrium,
i.e., when individuals are satisfied by getting close to (but not necessarily achieving)
their best responses. Glazer and Rubinstein (2012) provides a mechanism design ap-
proach where the content and the framing of the mechanism affect individuals’ ability
to manipulate their information.11
In the rational domain, Ohashi (2012) provides sufficiency results for ex-post im-
plementation with two individuals in an environment that is economic and has a bad
outcome. Our sufficiency results for the case of two individuals differ with those of
Ohashi (2012) in three dimensions: (i) we allow for non-economic environments, (ii) we
do not require the existence of a bad outcome, and (iii) we allow individuals’ choices to
violate the standard axioms of rationality.
3 Motivating Example
The following example aims to display the intricacies concerning the design of a
mechanism which implements a generalized welfare notion [strict generalized Pareto
optimality due to Bernheim and Rangel (2009)] in EPE with two individuals whose
10Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) also provide analyses of full
implementation under incomplete information allowing for different informational assumptions. Indeed,
there is a large literature on implementation, and it would not be possible to mention many interesting
work here. Instead, we refer the interested reader to surveys such as Maskin (1985), Moore (1992),
Jackson (2001), Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002), Palfrey (2002), and Serrano (2004).
11Some of the other related work include Cabrales and Serrano (2011) and Saran (2011).
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choices do not satisfy the standard axioms of rationality (alternatively, the weak axiom
of revealed preferences abbreviated to WARP henceforth).12 In fact, the individuals’
choices involve three types of well-known behavioral biases: (1) attraction effect, (2)
status-quo bias, and (3) Condorcet cycles. Below, we discuss these biases before going
into the details of the example.
Attraction effect:
One of the commonly observed behavioral aspects implying a violation of the stan-
dard rationality assumptions is the attraction effect :13 Decoy alternatives, alternatives
that are known to be dominated by other alternatives, can cause preference reversals
when they are introduced into the choice set. When an alternative (the decoy) is infe-
rior to a particular alternative in terms of all relevant attributes yet at the same time is
superior in some attributes and inferior in others than another alternative, an individ-
ual facing these alternatives altogether might be inclined to choose the non-dominated
alternative. A relatively well-known real-life example makes it clearer: Consider the fol-
lowing options that were presented for subscription to The Economist Magazine at some
point: Option (A) Internet-only subscription for $59, Option (B) Print-only subscription
for $125, Option (C) Print-and-Internet subscription for $125. One would immediately
realize that Option B is dominated in all relevant attributes by Option C. At first, it
might even seem puzzling to see an alternative like Option B (the decoy), which one
would never expect to be chosen. Yet, it is common sense that anyone who is offered all
three options would be inclined towards Option C.
Herne (1997) demonstrates how the presence of a decoy alternative causes the at-
traction effect in a policy-making context. One of her findings is in part the motivation
behind our example: In September 1993, Finland took the decision to build a new nu-
clear power plant to a parliamentary vote. The majority of the opponents of nuclear
power favored the alternative of decentralized solar power plants. Even though it was
not on the table at all, the supporters of the nuclear power plant used coal power plants
as a point of comparison to nuclear power plants. Nuclear power dominated coal as it
12Sen (1971) shows that a choice correspondence satisfies the WARP (and be represented by a com-
plete and transitive preference relation) if and only if it satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives
(referred to as IIA or Sen’s α) and an expansion consistency axiom (known as Sen’s β). We refer to
these as the standard axioms of rationality. Formally, we say that the individual choice correspondence
C : X → X satisfies Sen’s α if whenever x ∈ S ⊂ T for some S, T ∈ X , x ∈ C(T ) implies x ∈ C(S).
Meanwhile, we say that the individual choice correspondence C : X → X satisfies Sen’s β if x, y ∈ S ⊂ T
for some S, T ∈ X , and x, y ∈ C(S) implies x ∈ C(T ) if and only if y ∈ C(T ).
13A seminal paper for the attraction effect is Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982). See also Ok, Ortoleva,
and Riella (2015).
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was more environment friendly and more reliable, at the time, in terms of stability and
price. On the other hand, solar power was better for the environment when compared to
both nuclear power and coal. However, the high costs of solar panels and intermittency
made it less appealing than nuclear power and coal in terms of reliability. That is, coal
was dominated by nuclear power in environment and reliability dimensions, but solar
power dominated coal only in the dimension of environment. In this case, the supporters
of nuclear power deliberately used coal as a decoy alternative in the sense that it was not
intended to be implemented but was presented in the consideration set in order to in-
crease the attractiveness of nuclear power. That is, coal was asymmetrically dominated
by nuclear power in the presence of solar power.
Therefore, it was expected by the supporters of the nuclear power plant that nuclear
would be chosen from the grand set {coal, nuclear, solar}, whereas solar would be chosen
from the set {nuclear, solar}. Such a choice violates the WARP, in particular the IIA.14
Status-quo bias:
Another well-documented behavioral aspect that we observe in real life is the status-
quo bias.15 It is well-documented that when individuals face new alternatives to replace
a status-quo they have a tendency to keep the status-quo unless it is fully dominated
by one of the alternatives in all relevant attributes. A hypothetical example of many
developing countries is as follows: Suppose the status-quo source of energy in a country is
coal and the country is considering whether to switch to another type of energy. Suppose
further that the options on the table are nuclear and solar. Since nuclear dominates coal
(the status-quo) in the dimensions of environment and reliability, one might expect the
country to choose nuclear from the grand set {coal, nuclear, solar}, whereas coal might
be chosen from the set {coal, solar} since solar does not dominate coal (the status-quo)
in all relevant dimensions. Such a choice, by itself, does not violate the WARP. Yet
there might not be a clear winner between nuclear and solar when staying with the
status-quo is not an option, i.e., the choice from the set {nuclear, solar} might be both
nuclear and solar. Then, the WARP (in particular, Sen’s β) would not hold.16
Groups as participants (Condorcet cycles):
It is well-known that when more than three options are voted on in a pairwise fashion
by individuals, each of whom has “rational” preference orders, the preferences aggregated
14Please see Footnote 12 in order to see the associated formal definitions.
15A seminal paper for status-quo bias is Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), see also Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1991), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), and Dean, Kıbrıs, and Masatlioglu (2017).
16The definition of this axiom is presented in Footnote 12.
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may end up having Condorcet cycles.17 In particular, one might observe nuclear chosen
from the set {coal, nuclear}; coal chosen from the set {coal, solar}; and solar chosen
from the set {nuclear, solar}. Such a choice violates the WARP, as whatever is chosen
from the grand set {coal, nuclear, solar} would lead to a violation of both the IIA and
Sen’s β.
Now we are ready to present the details of our example. Suppose that two individuals,
whom we refer to as Alice and Bob, are to decide what type of energy to employ or jointly
invest in, be it coal energy, nuclear energy, or solar energy.18,19
Suppose that the revealed preferences of Alice and Bob are not necessarily rational.
That is, Alice and Bob’s individual choices from different subsets of the grand set X =
{coal, nuclear, solar} may violate the WARP.
Let the set of all relevant states of the world regarding these individual choices be
given by Θ. We assume that there is incomplete information regarding the true state
of the world θ ∈ Θ. In particular, the true state of the world is distributed knowledge
between Alice and Bob. That is, the set of all relevant states of the world, Θ, has a
product structure, i.e., Θ = ΘA ×ΘB. When the true state of the world is θ = (θA, θB),
Alice is informed only of the θA component of the true state of the world, whereas Bob is
informed only of the θB component of the true state of the world. Suppose that Alice and
Bob have two possible types each, denoted by Θi = {ρi, γi} for i ∈ {A,B}. So the set
of all possible states of the world is given by Θ = {(ρA, ρB), (ρA, γB), (γA, ρB), (γA, γB)}.
The individual choices of Alice and Bob at state θ ∈ Θ are described by the choice
correspondences, CθA : X → X , and CθB : X → X , where X denotes the set of non-empty
subsets of X and Cθi (S) ⊆ S for each S ∈ X and i ∈ {A,B}. Table 1 pinpoints the
specific choices to be used in our example with the convention that c stands for coal, n
for nuclear power, and s for solar energy.
Let us elaborate on the individual choices of Alice and Bob at each state:
At state (ρA, ρB), Alice’s choices can be rationalized by the preference relation n A
c ∼A s, and Bob’s choices can be rationalized by the preference relation s B n B c.
The identical choices of Alice and Bob at (ρA, γB) can be explained by the attraction
17Hurwicz (1986) investigates the problem of implementation when individuals represent groups of
rational agents. On the other hand, cyclic or intransitive preferences may also arise when individuals
are regular human beings (Tversky, 1969).
18Alice and Bob can also be interpreted as region A and region B within the same legislation, such
as two states in the U.S. or two countries in the E.U.
19In his Nobel Prize Lecture “Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals” (December 8,
2007), Eric Maskin provides an example in which an energy authority “is charged with choosing the
type of energy to be used by Alice and Bob” in the rational domain under complete information.
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S C
(ρA,ρB)
A C
(ρA,ρB)
B C
(ρA,γB)
A C
(ρA,γB)
B C
(γA,ρB)
A C
(γA,ρB)
B C
(γA,γB)
A C
(γA,γB)
B
{c, n, s} {n} {s} {n} {n} {n} {c} {c, s} {n, s}
{c, n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {c} {n} {c}
{c, s} {c, s} {s} {s} {s} {c} {c} {c} {s}
{n, s} {n} {s} {s} {s} {n, s} {n, s} {s} {s}
Table 1: Individual choices of Alice and Bob.
effect, as discussed above. That is, coal can be thought of as the decoy alternative where
the relevant attributes are environment and reliability. As in the Finland power plant
example, Alice and Bob choose nuclear from the grand set {coal, nuclear, solar} and so-
lar from the set {nuclear, solar}. They also choose nuclear from the set {coal, nuclear}.
This means Alice and Bob individually choose nuclear whenever it is presented with coal,
the decoy option. Yet, whenever coal is not available they choose solar over nuclear.
These also show that at state (ρA, γB), their individual choices cannot be rationalized by
a complete and transitive preference relation, as they violate the IIA.20 We would like to
emphasize that we allow individual choices to be interdependent : between (ρA, ρB) and
(ρA, γB), Alice’s private information (type) does not change; yet, the choice behavior of
Alice is not identical at these states.21
On the other hand, at state (γA, ρB), Bob’s choices can be rationalized by the pref-
erence relation c B s ∼B n, whereas Alice’s choices feature a status-quo bias where
the status-quo is coal. Similar to the hypothetical status-quo bias example discussed
above, Alice chooses nuclear from the grand set {coal, nuclear, solar} and coal from
the set {coal, solar}. Yet, when faced with the set {nuclear, solar} Alice is indifferent
and chooses both, possibly because nuclear and solar do not dominate each other in all
20In fact, there is no well-defined preference relation representing these choices. We wish to define
what we mean by a choice correspondence being represented by a well-defined preference relation. To
that regard, for any given individual choice correspondence C : X → X , letC be the induced preference
relation and be defined by: x C y if and only if there exists S ∈ X with x, y ∈ S and x ∈ C(S). On the
other hand, given a preference relation  on X, the induced normal choice correspondence C : X → X
is defined by C(S) = {x ∈ S : x  y for all y ∈ S} for S ∈ X . We say that the individual choice
correspondence C : X → X is represented by a well-defined preference relation C if C equals CC .
Further, Theorem 9 of Sen (1971) in the current setting says that a choice correspondence can be
represented with a well-defined preference relation (which is not necessarily transitive) if and only if
the choice correspondence satisfies Sen’s α and γ. While Sen’s α is defined in Footnote 12, a choice
correspondence C : X → X satisfies Sen’s γ if x ∈ C(S)∩C(T ) for some S, T ∈ X implies x ∈ C(S∪T ).
It can easily be verified that at state (ρA, γB) the individuals’ choices satisfy neither Sen’s α nor γ.
21We note that even though Alice does not know Bob’s private information (type), she knows the
set of all possible types for Bob. Therefore, Alice might consider what she were to choose contingent
upon each possible type of Bob. This is especially relevant when the information in the hands of Bob
is relevant for Alice’s choices as in the case of a common value auction.
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relevant dimensions. This also proves that Alice’s choices cannot be rationalized by a
complete and transitive preference relation as they violate Sen’s β.22
Finally, at state (γA, γB), neither of the individual choices can be rationalized by a
complete and transitive preference relation because the individual choices of Alice and
Bob violate the IIA and Sen’s β.23 Furthermore, Alice’s choices lead to a Condorcet cycle
as discussed above. In particular, Alice chooses nuclear from the set {coal, nuclear},
coal from the set {coal, solar}, and solar from the set {nuclear, solar}. Such a pattern
may arise when Alice makes her choices by consulting a group of individuals, such as
pairwise voting with her parents, or a parliamentary vote.
Next comes the social choice notion, the generalized welfare criterion developed by
Bernheim and Rangel (2009).24 This welfare criterion provides a choice theoretic foun-
dation for behavioral welfare economics as it is directly based on individual choices.
Following Bernheim and Rangel (2009), we say that an alternative x is strictly unam-
biguously chosen over another alternative z, if z is never chosen whenever x is available.
On the other hand, an alternative x is weakly unambiguously chosen over another al-
ternative z, if whenever they are both available, z is never chosen unless x is chosen as
well. These deliver an intuitive way of extending the notion of Pareto efficiency beyond
the rational domain:
An alternative x is a strict generalized Pareto optimum if there does not exist any
other alternative y, such that y is weakly unambiguously chosen over x for every indi-
vidual, and y is strictly unambiguously chosen over x for some individual(s). We refer
to a strict generalized Pareto optimum alternative as a BR-optimal outcome.
The social planner who faces the individual choices of Alice and Bob does not know
the true state of the world but cares about their welfare according to the welfare notion
of Bernheim and Rangel (2009). Thus, the planner aims to provide Alice and Bob a
state contingent allocation which is BR-optimal at every state.25
When individual choices can be rationalized with a complete and transitive pref-
22Even though Sen’s β fails, Alice’s individual choice correspondence can be represented by a well-
defined (but intransitive) preference relation as both Sen’s α and γ hold. See Footnotes 12 and 20 for
the definitions.
23At this state, neither of the individual’s choices can be represented by a well-defined preference
relation as the IIA is violated for both of the individuals. For more, please see Footnotes 12 and 20.
24Another paper that provides a welfare analysis that is in line with non-rational choices is Rubinstein
and Salant (2011).
25BR-optimal alternatives are defined under certainty. There is not an easy way to generalize this
notion of efficiency to the case of uncertainty as the individual choices of Alice and Bob violate the
standard rationality axioms and hence the expected utility hypothesis. So, the goal of the social planner
can be thought of as obtaining an ex-post strict generalized Pareto optimal state contingent allocation.
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erence relation, the BR-optimal outcomes are the same as the standard strict Pareto
optimal outcomes. Therefore, at (ρA, ρB), the BR-optimal outcomes are nuclear and
solar. On the other hand, at (ρA, γB), since coal is never chosen (except when it is
offered as a singleton), it is easy to see that the BR-optimal outcomes are nuclear and
solar.26 At (γA, ρB), coal is strictly unambiguously chosen over solar by both Alice and
Bob.27 Hence, solar is not BR-optimal at (γA, ρB). Even though coal is also strictly un-
ambiguously chosen over nuclear by Bob at (γA, ρB), coal is not weakly unambiguously
chosen over nuclear by Alice, since Alice chooses nuclear from the set {coal, nuclear} at
(γA, ρB). Thus, the BR-optimal outcomes at (γA, ρB) are coal and nuclear. Finally, at
(γA, γB), solar is strictly unambiguously chosen over nuclear by Alice and it is weakly
unambiguously chosen over nuclear by Bob.28 So, nuclear is not BR-optimal at (γA, γB).
Both coal and solar are BR-optimal at (γA, γB), since from the set {coal, solar} Alice
chooses coal and Bob solar at (γA, γB).
The BR-optimal alternatives contingent on the states are summarized in Table 2.
As in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), a social choice set (SCS) refers to a selection of
State (ρA, ρB) (ρA, γB) (γA, ρB) (γA, γB)
BR-optimal alternatives {n, s} {n, s} {c, n} {c, s}
Table 2: BR-optimal alternatives.
state contingent allocations. In fact, the BR-optimal alternatives form a collection of
state contingent allocations and we refer to it as the BR-optimal SCS. In what fol-
lows, the planner aims to implement a particular mutually exhaustive selection from the
BR-optimal SCS, which is given by F = {f, f ′}, described in Table 3: F is mutually
State (ρA, ρB) (ρA, γB) (γA, ρB) (γA, γB)
f n n n s
f ′ s s c c
Table 3: The social choice set F .
exhaustive as {f(θ)} ∪ {f ′(θ)} equals the set of BR-optimal outcomes at every θ ∈ Θ.29
26We also note that at (ρA, γB), even though nuclear is strictly unambiguously chosen over solar by
Alice at (ρA, γB), nuclear is not weakly unambiguously chosen over solar by Bob since Bob chooses
solar from the set {nuclear, solar} at (ρA, γB).
27Whenever coal is present, solar is never chosen by both Alice and Bob at (γA, ρB).
28At (γA, γB), Alice never chooses nuclear when solar is available; Bob chooses nuclear only if he
chooses solar as well.
29We note that there is no particular reason other than simplicity for choosing the mutually exhaustive
selection {f, f ′} as the SCS F . In general, the design of a mechanism would depend on the particular
SCS under consideration.
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3.1 The mechanism
A mechanism makes Alice and Bob send individual messages to the social planner
and describes the outcome to be implemented as a function of these messages. We
consider the following mechanism: messages available to Alice and Bob are given by
MA = {U,M,D} and MB = {L,M,R}, respectively; the outcome function that maps
messages to alternatives is represented by g : M → X and is described in Table 4. This
Bob
Alice
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
Table 4: The mechanism µ for Alice and Bob.
mechanism is denoted by µ = (M, g), with M = MA ×MB and g : M → X.
In what follows, we show that this mechanism implements the aforementioned goal
of the social planner in EPE. But first, we turn to the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes
of µ = (M, g).
de Clippel (2014) points out an intuitive and straightforward extension of the notion
of NE involving individuals’ choices that cannot be rationalized by a complete and tran-
sitive preference relation. The intuition is as follows: for each individual, the equilibrium
outcome should be among the chosen within the set of alternatives he/she can gener-
ate by unilateral deviations. This intuition is aligned with the opportunity criterion of
Sugden (2004) in that the set of alternatives an individual is free to choose from, i.e.,
the opportunity set of an individual, is determined in a mechanism by the messages of
the other individuals.
We follow de Clippel (2014) and denote the opportunity sets of Alice and Bob in our
mechanism by OµA(mB) := {g(mA,mB)|mA ∈ MA} and OµB(mA) := {g(mA,mB)|mB ∈
MB}, respectively. We are now ready to give a formal definition of an NE of our
mechanism at a given state of the world.
We say that m∗ = (m∗A,m
∗
B) is a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism µ = (M, g) at
θ if g(m∗) ∈ CθA(OµA(m∗B)) and g(m∗) ∈ CθB(OµB(m∗A)). Whenever m∗ is an NE of µ at θ,
we refer to g(m∗) as a Nash equilibrium outcome of µ at θ.
Let us exemplify by identifying the NE of our mechanism at state (γA, γB). Please
refer to Table 1 for the individuals’ choices at (γA, γB).
If Alice sends the message U , Bob can unilaterally generate the set {c, n} under the
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mechanism µ, i.e., OµB(U) = {c, n}. Bob chooses c from the set {c, n} at (γA, γB), which
implies that Bob finds it optimal to send the message M . The best response action M
chosen by Bob against Alice’s message U is depicted in Table 5 by a superscript B in
cell (U,M). Similarly, when Alice sends the message M , Bob can unilaterally generate
the set {c, s} under the mechanism µ, i.e., OµB(M) = {c, s}, and Bob chooses s from the
set {c, s} at (γA, γB). Thus, Bob finds it optimal to send the message M against Alice’s
action M . Finally, if Alice sends the message D, Bob can unilaterally generate the set
{n, s} under the mechanism µ, i.e., OµB(D) = {n, s}. Bob chooses s from the set {c, n}
at (γA, γB); hence, both M and R are the best responses for Bob.
On the other hand, when Bob sends the message L, Alice can unilaterally generate
the set {c, n} under the mechanism µ, i.e., OµA(L) = {c, n}. Alice chooses n from the set
{c, n} at (γA, γB). Therefore, her best responses to Bob sending message L consist of
U and D, which are indicated in Table 5 by a superscript A in cells (U,L) and (D,L).
If Bob sends the message M , Alice can unilaterally generate the set {c, s} under the
mechanism µ, i.e., OµA(M) = {c, s}. Alice chooses c from the set {c, s} at (γA, γB).
Finally, when Bob sends the message R, Alice can unilaterally generate the set {c, n, s}
under the mechanism µ, i.e., OµA(R) = {c, n, s}. Alice chooses both c and s from the set
{c, n, s} at (γA, γB).
The resulting best responses are summarized in Table 5, which shows that the NE of
the mechanism µ at state (γA, γB) are the message profiles (U,M) and (D,R). Hence,
the corresponding NE outcomes at (γA, γB) are c and s.
L M R
U An A c B n
M c sB Ac
D An sB A s B
Table 5: The best responses and Nash equilibria of the mechanism at (γA, γB).
Repeating this exercise, one can easily show that the NE and NE outcomes of our
mechanism at other states of the world are as presented in Table 6 (where NE message
profiles are depicted using circles in the corresponding cells).
Going over Tables 2 and 6 reveals that the set of BR-optimal outcomes and the set
of NE outcomes of our mechanism coincide at every state of the world. Therefore, if the
true state of the world were common knowledge between Alice and Bob, our mechanism
would be (fully) implementing the BR-optimal outcomes in NE at every state.
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State: (ρA, ρB) State: (ρA, γB) State: (γA, ρB) State: (γA, γB)
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
NE outcomes: {n, s} NE outcomes: {n, s} NE outcomes: {c, n} NE outcomes: {c, s}
Table 6: Nash equilibria and Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism.
3.2 Ex-post equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism
With incomplete information, the state of the world is distributed knowledge between
Alice and Bob as they can only observe their own types before sending their messages.
Thus, their plans of actions (strategies) can depend only on their own types and not the
whole state of the world.
Therefore, under incomplete information, the strategies of Alice and Bob in the
mechanism µ should be measurable with respect to their private information: a strategy
for Alice and Bob in µ is a function σi : Θi →Mi for i ∈ {A,B}.
There is not a clear way of defining a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the mechanism
µ in our example. The main reason is not because we have not specified any beliefs
over Θ, but because the individual choices of Alice and Bob violate standard rationality
axioms concerning certain outcomes: at states (ρA, γB) and (γA, γB), Alice and Bob do
not have a well-defined preference relation on X, while at state (γA, ρB), Alice’s choices
can be represented with a well-defined but intransitive preference relation on X.30 Thus,
Alice and Bob cannot be modeled as (expected) utility maximizers.
Similarly, as there is no clear way to evaluate an individual’s well-being with mixed
strategies in our setup, we restrict our attention to pure strategies in the mechanism µ.
Fortunately, a pure strategy EPE of our mechanism is belief-free and does not require
any expectation considerations. We provide the definition of an EPE of our mechanism:
We say that the strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗A, σ
∗
B) is an ex-post equilibrium of the
mechanism µ = (M, g) if for all θ ∈ Θ, g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ CθA(OµA(σ∗B(θB))) and g(σ∗(θ)) ∈
CθB(O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(θA))). In words, an EPE requires that the strategies of Alice and Bob induce
an NE of the mechanism µ at every state of the world and that they are measurable
with respect to their private information.
The following shows that there are three EPE of our mechanism, two of which are
30Please see Footnotes 12, 20, 22, and 23.
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equivalent in terms of the outcomes they generate:
Claim 1. The strategy profiles σ′∗ = (σ′∗A , σ
′∗
B), σ
′′∗ = (σ′′∗A , σ
′′∗
B ), and σ
′′′∗ = (σ′′∗A , σ
′′′∗
B )
described below are the only EPE of the mechanism µ = (M, g), where the outcomes
generated under σ′′∗ and σ′′′∗ are equivalent (i.e., g(σ′′∗(θ)) = g(σ′′′∗(θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ).
σ′∗ : σ′∗A(ρA) = U σ
′∗
A(γA) = D and σ
′∗
B(ρB) = L σ
′∗
B(γB) = R,
σ′′∗ : σ′′∗A (ρA) = D σ
′′∗
A (γA) = U and σ
′′∗
B (ρB) = M σ
′′∗
B (γB) = M,
σ′′′∗ : σ′′′∗A (ρA) = M σ
′′′∗
A (γA) = U and σ
′′′∗
B (ρB) = M σ
′′′∗
B (γB) = M.
Below we focus on two EPE, σ′∗ and σ′′∗, as σ′′∗ and σ′′′∗ correspond to the same
outcomes under µ. In Table 7, we summarize the EPE outcomes of µ under σ′∗ and
σ′′∗ (where message profiles corresponding to σ′∗ are depicted using circles while those
associated with σ′′∗ are indicated using squares in the corresponding cells).
State: (ρA, ρB) State: (ρA, γB) State: (γA, ρB) State: (γA, γB)
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
EPE outcomes: {n, s} EPE outcomes: {n, s} EPE outcomes: {c, n} EPE outcomes: {c, s}
Table 7: Ex-post equilibria and ex-post equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism.
Tables 2 and 7 show that the set of BR-optimal outcomes and the set of EPE out-
comes of µ coincide. Referring to Table 3 which describes the SCS F , we also observe
that g(σ′∗(θ)) = f(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ, and g(σ′′∗(θ)) = f ′(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ (while
g(σ′′′∗(θ)) = f ′(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ holds trivially). That is, (1) each social choice function
(SCF) in the SCS induces the same outcomes under a particular EPE of the mechanism
µ; and (2) for each EPE of the mechanism µ, there exists a particular SCF in the SCS
that induces the same outcomes state by state. Thus, µ (fully) ex-post implements
the SCS F . Indeed, in Section 7.1 we show that the mechanism µ is the “simplest
mechanism” ex-post implementing the SCS F .
3.3 The revelation principle fails
Now we show that the revelation principle (for partial implementation) fails in our
example. Recall that the revelation principle implies if there exists a mechanism that
partially (ex-post) implements a particular SCF, then there exists a direct revelation
mechanism that truthfully partially (ex-post) implements the same SCF.
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Consider the SCF f given in Table 3, and notice that f(θ) is a BR-optimal alternative
at every θ ∈ Θ. Because σ′∗ is an EPE of µ with g(σ′∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, the
mechanism µ partially ex-post implements the SCF f . However, the corresponding
direct revelation mechanism, gd : Θ → X, given in Table 8, fails to partially ex-post
implement f truthfully as truthful revelation is not an EPE of gd.31 When the state is
Bob
Alice
ρB γB
ρA n n
γA n s
Table 8: The direct revelation mechanism gd.
(ρA, γB), reporting truthfully delivers n (circled in Table 8). But, the opportunity set of
Alice at state (ρA, γB) is given by {n, s} and n /∈ C(ρA,γB)A ({n, s}) = {s}.32
Therefore, the revelation principle may fail with individuals whose choices do not
satisfy the standard axioms of rationality. Hence, the argument saying that as long
as truthful revelation is an equilibrium it will be the salient one, even when there are
other equilibria, no longer holds. This, in turn, means partial implementation loses its
practical appeal when individuals’ choices do not comply with the standard axioms of
rationality. In Section 5, we show that the key axiom which guarantees the revelation
principle is the IIA.
To sum up, our motivating example displays that it is possible to have full ex-post
implementation under incomplete information when individuals’ choices do not satisfy
standard rationality axioms. This is one of the most reasonable ways for behavioral
implementation under incomplete information since (i) it is belief free and thus demand-
ing Bayesian considerations are not required, and (ii) the revelation principle might fail
and, hence, partial implementation through direct revelation mechanisms loses its prac-
tical appeal. Below, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral
(ex-post) implementation under incomplete information. To move forward, we turn to
notation and definitions for the general setup.
31A direct revelation mechanism is one where the message sets equal the type spaces of individuals.
This is why it is enough to specify only an outcome function gd : Θ→ X to describe a direct revelation
mechanism.
32Indeed, misreporting her type as γA (and obtaining s) is Alice’s best response at state (ρA, γB)
when Bob reports truthfully γB .
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4 Notation and Definitions
Consider a set of individuals, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}, who have to select an
alternative from a non-empty set of alternatives X. Let Θ denote the set of all relevant
states of the world regarding the choices of the individuals from (the subsets of) the set of
alternatives X. We assume that there is incomplete information among the individuals
regarding the true state of the world, and that the true state of the world is distributed
knowledge. That is, Θ has a product structure, i.e., Θ = ×i∈NΘi where θi ∈ Θi denotes
the private information (type) of individual i ∈ N at state θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ. We also
assume that the choice behavior of individual i at state θ is described by the individual
choice correspondence Cθi : X → X , such that the feasibility requirement of Cθi (S) ⊆ S
for all S ∈ X holds where X denotes the set of all non-empty subsets of X. Therefore, the
environment we are interested in can be summarized by the tuple 〈N,X,Θ, (Cθi )i∈N,θ∈Θ〉.
We assume that the environment, 〈N,X,Θ, (Cθi )i∈N,θ∈Θ〉, is common knowledge among
the individuals, and that it is known to the designer. We also note that our setup allows
(but does not depend on) individual choices to be interdependent. That is, individuals
are allowed to choose differently when their own type is fixed but others’ are different.33
An SCF is a function f : Θ → X that specifies a socially optimal alternative—as
evaluated by the planner—for each possible state of the world. In other words, f can be
viewed as a state contingent allocation. As there may be many socially optimal state
contingent allocations that a designer wishes to consider simultaneously, we focus on
social choice sets (SCS) rather than SCFs. An SCS, denoted by F , is simply a set of
SCFs, i.e., F ⊂ {f |f : Θ→ X}.34 F denotes the set of non-empty SCSs.
We denote a mechanism by µ = (M, g) where Mi denotes the non-empty set of
messages available to individual i with M = ×i∈NMi, and g : M → X describes the
outcome function that specifies the alternative to be selected for each message profile.
As in de Clippel (2014), we define the opportunity set of an individual under a
mechanism as the set of alternatives that he/she can generate by unilateral deviations
given the messages of the other individuals: The opportunity set of individual i under
µ = (M, g) for each m−i ∈ M−i is given by Oµi (m−i) = {g(mi,m−i) ∈ X : mi ∈ Mi}.
Consequently, an NE of a mechanism at a particular state of the world is defined as
33Please see also Footnote 21.
34We note that it is customary to denote a social choice rule as an SCS rather than a social choice
correspondence under incomplete information. To that regard, we refer to Postlewaite and Schmeidler
(1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), Jackson (1991) and Bergemann and Morris (2008).
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follows:35 A message profile m∗ is a Nash equilibrium of µ = (M, g) at θ if g(m∗) ∈
Cθi (O
µ
i (m
∗
−i)) for all i ∈ N . The intuition is that for each individual, the NE outcome
should be among the chosen alternatives within the set of alternatives the individual
can generate by unilateral deviations.
Next, we turn to the case of incomplete information. We note that the mechanism µ
in our environment induces an incomplete information game-form. Hence, a strategy for
individual i, a contingent plan of actions, has to specify an action for each possible type
of i. We denote a strategy of an individual i by σi : Θi → Mi, under the mechanism
µ = (M, g). As mentioned before, there is no clear way to adopt a Bayesian formulation
and employ mixed strategies in our setup because individuals’ choices may violate the
standard axioms of rationality. So, we restrict attention to pure EPE.
Definition 1. A strategy profile σ∗ : Θ→M is an ex-post equilibrium of µ = (M, g)
if for each θ ∈ Θ, we have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (σ∗−i(θ−i))) for all i ∈ N .
In words, an EPE requires that the outcomes generated by the mechanism be NE at
every state of the world, while individuals’ strategies have to be measurable with respect
to only their own types. This delivers the notion of ex-post implementability:
Definition 2. We say that an SCS F ∈ F is ex-post implementable if there exists
a mechanism µ = (M, g) such that:
(i) For every f ∈ F , there exists an EPE σ∗ of µ = (M, g) that satisfies f = g ◦ σ∗,
i.e., f(θ) = g(σ∗(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ; and
(ii) For every EPE σ∗ of µ = (M, g), there exists f ∈ F such that g ◦ σ∗ = f , i.e.,
g(σ∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Given an SCS, ex-post implementability demands the existence of a mechanism such
that (i) every SCF in the SCS must be sustained by an EPE strategy profile, and (ii)
every EPE strategy profile of the mechanism must correspond to an SCF in the SCS.
Hence, this is full ex-post implementation. We refer to an SCF f as being partially
ex-post implementable whenever condition (i) in Definition 2 holds.
Any mechanism that ex-post implements an SCS should take into consideration the
private information of the individuals. However, individuals may misreport their private
information. This is why we turn to the concept of deception. We denote a deception by
35Korpela (2012) refers to this concept as behavioral Nash equilibrium while we follow de Clippel
(2014) and designate this notion by NE.
18
individual i as αi : Θi → Θi. The interpretation is that αi(θi) is individual i’s reported
type. Therefore, α(θ) := (α1(θ1), α2(θ2), . . . , αn(θn)) is a profile of reported types, which
might be deceptive. We are now ready to move forward with the necessary conditions
for ex-post implementation.
5 Three or More Individuals
In this section, we investigate necessary as well as sufficient conditions for ex-post
implementation when there are three or more individuals.
We employ the following notion of consistency of a collection of sets under incomplete
information in both necessity and sufficiency. As the name evidently suggests, our notion
can be viewed as an incomplete information version of the notion of consistency of de
Clippel (2014). When the meaning is clear, we refer to this notion simply as consistency.
Definition 3. We say that a non-empty collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i)|i ∈ N, f ∈
F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} ⊂ X is consistent with the SCS F ∈ F under incomplete infor-
mation if for every SCF f ∈ F , we have
(i) for all i ∈ N , f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi, and
(ii) for any deception profile α with f ◦ α /∈ F , there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ and i∗ ∈ N such
that f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗))).
A collection of sets S satisfying consistency with an SCS F under incomplete in-
formation obeys the property that Si(f, θ−i) does not depend on θi for all i ∈ N and
f ∈ F and θ−i ∈ Θ−i and the following hold: (1) Given any i ∈ N and any f ∈ F and
any θ−i ∈ Θ−i, it must be that i’s choices when he/she is of type θ′i at state (θ′i, θ−i)
contains f(θ′i, θ−i) for all θ
′
i ∈ Θi; and (2) given any f ∈ F , whenever there is a deception
profile α that leads to an outcome not compatible with the SCS, i.e., f ◦ α /∈ F , there
exists an informant state θ∗ and an informant individual i∗ such that i∗ does not choose
at state θ∗ the alternative f(α(θ∗)) (the alternative generated by this deception) from
Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗)).
Our first result establishes that consistency with an SCS is a necessary condition for
that SCS to be ex-post implementable, and this result is not restricted to the case of
three or more individuals.
Theorem 1. If an SCS F ∈ F is ex-post implementable, then there exists a non-empty
collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i)|i ∈ N, f ∈ F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} consistent with F under
incomplete information.
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If a mechanism µ ex-post implements an SCS F , then Theorem 1 establishes that
the opportunity sets obtained from the mechanism form a non-empty collection of sets
consistent with F . Moreover, our necessary condition implies analogs of the necessary
conditions in the rational domain a` la Bergemann and Morris (2008): an ex-post-choice
monotonicity condition and a quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility condition. In
what follows, we prove that both of these conditions are necessary for ex-post imple-
mentation.
Definition 4. An SCS F ∈ F is ex-post choice monotonic if, for every SCF f ∈ F
and deception profile α with f ◦ α /∈ F , there is a state θ∗ ∈ Θ and an individual i∗ ∈ N
and a non-empty set of alternatives S∗ ∈ X such that
(i) f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (S∗), and
(ii) f((θ′i∗ , α−i∗(θ
∗
−i∗))) ∈ C
(θ′
i∗ ,α−i∗ (θ
∗
−i∗ ))
i∗ (S
∗) for all θ′i∗ ∈ Θi∗.
Proposition 1. If there exists a non-empty collection of sets consistent with an SCS
F ∈ F under incomplete information, then F is ex-post choice monotonic.
Ex-post choice monotonicity requires that when there is a deception leading to an
outcome not compatible with the state contingent allocations allowed by the SCS, there
exists an informant state and an informant whistle-blower for this state and an infor-
mant reward set for this whistle-blower such that (i) the whistle-blower does not choose
the outcome arising due to going along with the deception from the reward set at the
informant state; and (ii) the whistle-blower does not falsely accuse the other individuals
of deceiving when the outcome is compatible with the SCS at hand.
Definition 5. An SCS F ∈ F is quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatible if, for
every SCF f ∈ F and state θ ∈ Θ and individual i ∈ N , there exists a non-empty subset
of alternatives S ∈ X such that
(i) f(θ) ∈ Cθi (S), and
(ii) S ⊇ {f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}.
Proposition 2. If there exists a non-empty collection of sets consistent with an SCS F ∈
F under incomplete information, then F is quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatible.
The set {f(θ′i, θ−i) : θ′i ∈ Θi} ∈ X specifies the set of alternatives achievable by
individual i under an SCF f given others’ type profile θ−i. Quasi-ex-post choice incentive
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compatibility of an SCS F demands that for every SCF f ∈ F and for every state θ ∈ Θ
and for every individual i ∈ N , there exists a set S from which i chooses f(θ) at θ while
S contains all the alternatives achievable by i under f given θ−i.
Quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility describes a necessary condition for par-
tial ex-post implementation of each f ∈ F . However, as we have shown in section 3.3,
the revelation principle does not have to hold in our setup. In fact, when the contain-
ment relation in (ii) of quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility holds strictly, the
revelation principle may fail. Consequently, Lemma 1 below identifies a straightforward
necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle when individuals’ choices
do not satisfy the standard axioms of rationality.
Lemma 1. An SCF f is partially truthfully (ex-post) implementable in a direct mecha-
nism if and only if for every θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , we have f(θ) ∈ Cθi ({f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}).
In general, the condition provided in Lemma 1 neither implies nor is implied by
the quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility condition. Yet, it is easy to see that if
the IIA holds, then quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility implies the revelation
principle.36
Proposition 3. If individual choices satisfy the IIA, then quasi-ex-post choice incentive
compatibility implies the revelation principle.
In summary, these establish that if a mechanism µ partially ex-post implements an
SCF f and individuals’ choices satisfy the IIA axiom, then there exists a direct revelation
mechanism gd which partially implements the same SCF f in truthful EPE.
Put differently, the revelation principle holds whenever individuals’ choices satisfy
the IIA.37
The failure of the revelation principle when individuals’ choices do not satisfy the
standard axioms of rationality leads us to search for indirect mechanisms, even for partial
implementation. In this context, our results identifying (indirect) mechanisms for full
implementation are also useful as full implementation implies partial implementation.
Next, we identify sufficient conditions for ex-post implementation when there are
at least three individuals. The sufficient conditions for the case of two individuals is
analyzed separately in Section 6.
36Please see Footnote 12 for the definition of the IIA (Sen’s α).
37Saran (2011) studies conditions for revelation principle to hold when individuals have menu-
dependent preferences over interim Anscombe-Aumann acts.
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Ex-post implementation of an SCS F is not feasible when there is no collection of sets
consistent with F . Therefore, the planner should start the design by identifying such
collections and then explore additional requirements to be imposed on these collections
for sufficiency. Below, we present such new conditions:38
Definition 6. We say that a non-empty set of alternatives S ∈ X satisfies the choice
incompatible pair property at state θ if for each alternative x ∈ S there exist indi-
viduals i, j ∈ N such that x /∈ Cθi (S) and x /∈ Cθj (S).
This condition implies some level of disagreement among individuals regarding the
socially optimal alternatives at a given state of the world. In words, a set satisfies the
choice incompatible pair property at a state, if for each alternative in this set there exists
a pair of individuals who do not choose this alternative from this set at that state. Then,
any alternative in this set can be chosen by at most n− 2 individuals at that particular
state.39
The choice incompatible pair property plays an important role in Theorem 2: This
property coupled with consistency are sufficient for ex-post implementation.
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 3. If F ∈ F is an SCS for which there exist
(i) a collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i) : i ∈ N, f ∈ F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} consistent with F
under incomplete information, and
(ii) a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S S ⊆ X¯ which satisfies the choice incom-
patible pair property at every state θ ∈ Θ,
then F is ex-post implementable.
In words, Theorem 2 establishes the following when there are three or more individ-
uals who are not in perfect agreement concerning the socially optimal alternatives: If (i)
there exists a collection of sets S consistent with a non-empty SCS F under incomplete
information, and (ii) there exists a set of alternatives X¯ which contains every alternative
that appears in S and satisfies the choice incompatible pair property at every state of
the world, then F is ex-post implementable.40
38We note that there is plenty of room for other sufficient conditions since we do not restrict individual
choices by requiring universal choice axioms. However, it seems neither easy nor practical to close the
gap between the necessary and sufficient conditions.
39The choice incompatible pair property is similar to the economic environment assumption in the
rational domain. Yet, it is weaker in our setup since it is now defined on a particular set.
40Non-emptiness of S and X¯ follow from F ∈ F .
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Theorem 2 identifies conditions that make sure that all EPE of the mechanism de-
scribed in Section A.1 falls under Rule 1 at every state of the world. Below, we provide
another set of sufficient conditions by employing the same mechanism, but this time
allowing for EPE to arise under Rule 2 and Rule 3 as well. To do so, we turn to the
counterpart of the no-veto power property in our environment.
Definition 7. We say that an SCF f satisfies the choice no-veto-power property
on a non-empty set of alternatives S ∈ X at state θ ∈ Θ if x ∈ Cθi (S) for all i ∈ N \{j}
for some j ∈ N implies f(θ) = x.
The choice-no-veto power property on a set, at a particular state, requires that if an
alternative is chosen from this set by at least n − 1 individuals at the particular state,
then this alternative must be f -optimal at this particular state.
Our second sufficiency result for the case of three or more individuals employs a
combination of consistency and the choice no-veto-power property. Below, we present
this sufficiency condition followed by the result.41
Definition 8. An SCS F ∈ F satisfies the consistency-no-veto property whenever
there exist
(i) a collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i) : i ∈ N, f ∈ F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} such that for all
f ∈ F and for all i ∈ N , f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi,
(ii) and a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S S ⊆ X¯
such that for any collection of product sets of states {Θ¯f}f ∈F with Θ¯ =
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f ⊂ Θ,
there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that
(iii) f ∗ satisfies choice no-veto-power property on X¯ at every θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, and
(iv) if for any f ∈ F and any deception profile α, f(α(θ)) 6= f ∗(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯f ,
then there exists i∗ ∈ N and θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f such that f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗))).
Theorem 3. Let n ≥ 3. If an SCS F ∈ F satisfies the consistency-no-veto property,
then F is ex-post implementable.
Given a non-empty SCS F , the consistency-no-veto property, in words, requires the
existence of a collection of sets S with the property that Si(f, θ−i) does not depend on
θi for all i ∈ N and f ∈ F and θ−i ∈ Θ−i and a set of alternatives X¯ which contains
every alternative that appears in S such that the following hold:
41The set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ is a product set whenever Θ¯ = ×i∈N Θ¯i where Θ¯i ⊆ Θi with the convention that
Θ¯ = ∅ whenever Θ¯i = ∅ for some i ∈ N .
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— Given any i ∈ N and any f ∈ F and any θ−i ∈ Θ−i, it must be that i’s choices
when he/she is of type θ′i at state (θ
′
i, θ−i) contains f(θ
′
i, θ−i) for all θ
′
i ∈ Θi; and
— for any collection of product sets of states {Θ¯f}f ∈F with Θ¯ =
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f ⊂ Θ, there
is an SCF f ∗ in F such that
– if θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, then f ∗ obeys the choice no-veto-power property on X¯ at θ, and
– if a deception profile α and an SCF f ∈ F lead to an outcome different than
f ∗(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯f , then there exists a whistle-blower i∗ ∈ N and an
informant state θ∗ such that i∗ does not choose at θ∗ the alternative f(α(θ∗))
(the alternative generated by this deception at θ∗) from Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗)).
Evidently, the consistency-no-veto property is analogous to the monotonicity-no-
veto condition of Jackson (1991) and the ex post monotonicity no veto property of
Bergemann and Morris (2008). Moreover, our findings are parallel with these papers in
the following sense: Jackson (1991) considers a rational domain with expected utility
maximizing individuals and establishes that monotonicity-no-veto and incentive com-
patibility and a condition called closure are sufficient for the Bayesian implementation
of SCSs. Meanwhile, Bergemann and Morris (2008) providing sufficiency conditions for
ex-post implementation in the rational domain employs ex-post monotonicity no veto
condition and ex-post incentive compatibility, both of which are “ex-post analogs of the
Bayesian implementation” conditions. In our setting, the closure condition is trivially
satisfied as in Bergemann and Morris (2008); by repeating the same arguments presented
in the proof of Proposition 2, one can easily show that quasi-ex-post choice incentive
compatibility is implied by (i) of the consistency-no-veto property.
A due remark concerns the cases when attention is restricted to the behavioral ex-
post implementation of an SCF. Then, the hypothesis of Theorem 3 simplifies to deliver
the following analog of Theorem 3 of Bergemann and Morris (2008):
Corollary 1. Let n ≥ 3. An SCF f : Θ→ X is ex-post implementable whenever there
exists a collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i) : i ∈ N, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} such that and for all
individuals i ∈ N , f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi, and there exists a set
of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S S ⊆ X¯ such that for any product set of states Θ¯ ⊂ Θ,
(i) f satisfies choice no-veto-power property on X¯ at every θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, and
(ii) for any deception profile α with f(α(θ)) 6= f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯, there exists i∗ ∈ N
and θ∗ ∈ Θ¯ such that f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗))).
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6 Two Individuals
We now turn to the case of two individuals. First, we slightly improve the necessary
conditions for the case of two individuals, and then provide sufficient conditions.
In what follows, Theorem 4 establishes that the notion of two-individual consistency
under incomplete information is necessary. This concept is defined below and improves
the notion of consistency—specified in Definition 3—slightly for the case of two individ-
uals. We refer to it as two-individual consistency when the meaning is clear.
Definition 9. We say that collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} ⊂ X and
S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} ⊂ X are two-individual consistent with the SCS
F ∈ F under incomplete information if
(i) for all f ∈ F , f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ C(θ
′
1,θ2)
1 (S1(f, θ2)) for each θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1,
(ii) for all f ∈ F , f(θ1, θ′2) ∈ C(θ1,θ
′
2)
2 (S2(f, θ1)) for each θ
′
2 ∈ Θ2,
(iii) for all f, f ′ ∈ F , S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ1) 6= ∅ for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2,
(iv) for all f ∈ F , if f ◦ α /∈ F , then there exists θ∗ = (θ∗1, θ∗2) ∈ Θ such that
either f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f, α2(θ∗2))) or f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f, α1(θ∗1))).
We wish to emphasize that (i) and (ii) of two-individual consistency is implied by (i)
of consistency while (ii) of consistency implies (iv) of two-individual consistency. That
is why the novel condition of two-individual consistency is (iii): For any given pairs of
SCFs in the SCS, the two collections of sets must be such that each set associated with
individual 1 has a common alternative with each set associated with individual 2.42
Theorem 4. Let n = 2. If an SCS F ∈ F is ex-post implementable, then there exist
collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1}
that are two-individual consistent with F under incomplete information.
Now, we display the practical implications of Theorem 4 pertaining to our motivating
example. We remind the reader that the individual choices of Alice and Bob and the
SCS under consideration are given in Table 1 and Table 3, respectively.
42Item (iii) of two-individual consistency, is similar in spirit to part (i)− (a) of Condition β of Dutta
and Sen (1991), a paper presenting a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with
two individuals under complete information in the rational domain.
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By employing two-individual consistency, below we investigate the collections of
sets SA = {SA(f, ρB), SA(f, γB), SA(f ′, ρB), SA(f ′, γB)} for Alice and SB = {SB(f, ρA),
SB(f, γA), SB(f
′, ρA), SB(f ′, γA)} for Bob.
In particular, using (i) and (ii) of two-individual consistency, we narrow down the
candidates for each of these sets as follows. Let us start with Alice:
SA(f, ρB): f(ρA, ρB) = n and f(γA, ρB) = n imply n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (SA(f, ρB)) and n ∈
C
(γA,ρB)
A (SA(f, ρB)). There are four such sets: {c, n, s}, {c, n}, {n, s}, {n}.
SA(f, γB): f(ρA, γB) = n and f(γA, γB) = s imply n ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (SA(f, γB)) and s ∈
C
(γA,γB)
A (SA(f, ρB)). There is only one such set: {c, n, s}.
SA(f
′, ρB): f ′(ρA, ρB) = s and f ′(γA, ρB) = c imply s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (SA(f ′, ρB)) and c ∈
C
(γA,ρB)
A (SA(f
′, ρB)). There is only one such set as well: {c, s}.
SA(f
′, γB): f ′(ρA, γB) = s and f ′(γA, γB) = c imply s ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (SA(f ′, ρB)) and c ∈
C
(γA,γB)
A (SA(f
′, ρB)). There is again only one such set: {c, s}.
Next comes Bob:
SB(f, ρA): f(ρA, ρB) = n and f(ρA, γB) = n imply n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (SB(f, ρA)) and n ∈
C
(ρA,γB)
B (SB(f, ρA)). There are two such sets: {c, n} and {n}.
SB(f, γA): f(γA, ρB) = n and f(γA, γB) = s imply n ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (SB(f, γA)) and s ∈
C
(γA,γB)
B (SB(f, γA)). There is again only one such set: {n, s}.
SB(f
′, ρA): f ′(ρA, ρB) = s and f ′(ρA, γB) = s imply s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (SB(f ′, ρA)) and s ∈
C
(ρA,γB)
B (SB(f
′, ρA)). There are three such sets {c, s} and {n, s} and {s} .
SB(f
′, γA): f ′(γA, ρB) = c and f ′(γA, γB) = c imply c ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (SB(f ′, γA)) and c ∈
C
(γA,γB)
B (SB(f
′, γA)). There are two such sets {c, n} and {c}.
Therefore, we conclude that SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s}, SA(f ′, ρB) = {c, s}, SA(f ′, γB) =
{c, s}, and SB(f, γA) = {n, s}.
Furthermore, condition (iii) of two-individual consistency implies that SA(f, θB) ∩
SB(f
′, θA) 6= ∅ and SA(f ′, θB)∩SB(f, θA) 6= ∅ for each θA ∈ {ρA, γA} and θB ∈ {ρB, γB}.
Thus, SA(f
′, ρB) ∩ SB(f, ρA) 6= ∅, and this implies SB(f, ρA) = {c, n}.
These uniquely identify 5 out of 8 of the two-individual consistent collections of sets of
Alice and Bob. In particular, we must have SA = {SA(f, ρB), {c, n, s}, {c, s}} and SB =
{{c, n}, {n, s}, SB(f ′, ρA), SB(f ′, γA)}. It is possible to narrow down SA and SB further
by employing condition (iv) of two-individual consistency. Yet, this would be tedious
since there are many deceptions to consider.43 However, the mechanism given in Table
43There are 15 possible deceptions where either Alice or Bob misrepresents their types. All 15 of
them lead to f ◦ α 6= f and 12 of them lead to f ′ ◦ α 6= f ′. It is useful to note that deceptions are
non-cooperative and hence measurable only with respect to private information. Thus, we cannot have
α(ρA, ρB) = (γA, ρB) and α(ρA, γB) = (ρA, ρB) where Alice lies about her type when her type is ρA
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4 implementing F in our motivating example implies the following collections of sets are
two-individual consistent with F : SA given by SA(f, ρB) = {c, n}, SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s},
SA(f
′, ρB) = {c, s}, SA(f ′, γB) = {c, s} and SB by SB(f, ρA) = {c, n}, SB(f, γA) =
{n, s}, SB(f ′, ρA) = {c, s}, SB(f ′, γA) = {c, n}. In Section 7.1, we show that this is not
the unique pair of two-individual consistent collections of sets with F .44
We proceed with sufficiency conditions for the case of two individuals. Below, we
introduce the additional properties needed to transform the necessary conditions into
sufficient ones concerning ex-post implementation with two individuals.
The first of these concerns choice incompatibility for the case of two individuals.
Definition 10. Given an SCS F ∈ F , we say that F involves choice incompatibility
among a non-empty set of alternatives S ∈ X and non-empty collections of sets S1 :=
{S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} ⊂ X and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} ⊂ X at state θ if
(i) x ∈ Cθi (S) implies x /∈ Cθj (S), i 6= j; and
(ii) for any T ∈ Si, x ∈ Cθi (T ) implies x /∈ Cθj (S), i = 1, 2 and i 6= j; and
(iii) for any deception profile α and any f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′, x ∈ Cθi (Si(f, αj(θj)))
implies x /∈ Cθj (Sj(f ′, αi(θi))), i = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Choice incompatibility conditions require that there is sufficiently strong disagree-
ment between the two individuals at a given state. Indeed, the intuition behind choice
incompatibility is as follows: A non-empty SCS F involves choice incompatibility among
a non-empty set of alternatives S and non-empty collections of sets S1 and S2 at state θ
means that the individual choices at θ are not aligned when (i) both individuals make
choices separately from S; and (ii) one individual, i, is making a choice from a set in
Si and the other individual, j, is making a choice from S where i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j;
and (iii) individual i makes a choice from a set in Si that is associated with a particular
SCF f and the other individual, j, makes a choice from a set in Sj which is associated
with a different SCF f ′ 6= f while f, f ′ ∈ F and i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j.45
and Bob’s type is ρB but not when her type is ρA and Bob’s type is γB .
44We identify another mechanism ex-post implementing F on page 34 that implies another pair of
two-individual consistent collections of sets with the only difference being SB(f
′, ρA) = {c}.
45Choice incompatibility has some relations with part (iv) of Condition µ2 of Moore and Repullo
(1990) and part (i)−(b) of Condition β of Dutta and Sen (1991); both among the necessary and sufficient
conditions for Nash implementation in the rational domain under complete information. These require
the existence of a common alternative x in the choice sets of the two individuals where the choice set
of the first individual is associated with a preference profile and alternative pair (R, a), while that of
the second with (R′, b) such that x being maximal with respect to some preference profile R′′ for both
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At this stage, we wish to emphasize that we handle cases in which individuals’ choices
are aligned later in the section, when we start discussing choice unanimity.
Theorem 5, below, shows that two-individual consistency coupled with choice incom-
patibility are sufficient for ex-post implementation.
Theorem 5. Let n = 2. If F ∈ F is an SCS for which there exist
(i) collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈
Θ1} which are two-individual consistent with F under incomplete information, and
(ii) a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈ S1∪ S2 S ⊆ X¯ such that F involves choice
incompatibility among X¯ and S1 and S2 at every θ ∈ Θ,
then F is ex-post implementable.
In words, when there are two individuals, Theorem 5 implies that if (i) there exist
individual specific collections of sets S1 and S2 that are two-individual consistent with
F under incomplete information, and (ii) there exists a set of alternatives X¯ which
contains every alternative that appears in S1 and S2 and the afore discussed choice
incompatibility among X¯ and S1 and S2 hold at every state of the world, then F is
ex-post implementable. That is, Theorem 5 demands sufficiently “strong” disagreement
between the two individuals for sufficiency of ex-post implementation.46
A common thread between Theorems 2 and 5 is that their hypotheses enable us
to sustain all EPE of the associated mechanisms under Rule 1 at every state of the
world. As was done in the case of three or more individuals, we provide another set of
sufficient conditions by employing the same mechanism presented in Section A.2, but
allowing EPE to arise under other rules as well. Because no-veto power is “hopelessly
strong” with two individuals (Moore & Repullo, 1990), we turn to the concept of choice
unanimity.
Definition 11. We say that an SCS F ∈ F respects choice unanimity on a non-
empty set of alternatives S ∈ X and non-empty collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈
of the individuals from these choice sets implies x being a member of the social choice correspondence
at R′′. On the other hand, choice incompatibility (akin to the economic environment assumption of
the rational domain with incomplete information) does not allow any alternative to be ranked first
by both individuals even when the two individuals’ choices are represented by complete and transitive
preferences. Thus, choice incompatibility brings about a requirement that is similar in spirit to part
(iv) of Condition µ2 and part (i)− (b) of Condition β.
46Ohashi (2012) presents sufficient conditions for ex-post implementation with two individuals in
the rational domain. Unlike ours, his sufficient conditions require the existence of a bad outcome: an
alternative that is strictly worse than any other in the union of the ranges of the SCFs in the SCS.
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F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} ⊂ X and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} ⊂ X at state θ if there exists
f ∗ ∈ F such that
(i) x ∈ Cθ1(S) ∩ Cθ2(S) implies f ∗(θ) = x; and
(ii) for any T ∈ Si, x ∈ Cθi (T ) ∩ Cθj (S) implies f ∗(θ) = x, for i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j;
and
(iii) for any deception profile α and f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′, x ∈ Cθi (Si(f, αj(θj))) ∩
Cθj (Sj(f
′, αi(θi))) implies f ∗(θ) = x.
The general intuition behind choice unanimity of an SCS F with two individuals is
that if the choices of the individuals (from some particular sets) agree at a given state,
then the SCS must respect this: the chosen alternatives must be achievable with one of
SCFs in the SCS at that state. It is a mild condition as it allows the SCS to accommodate
SCFs that are not restricted to deliver commonly agreed upon alternatives.
Our second sufficiency result for the case of two individuals makes use of the following
combination of consistency and choice unanimity:
Definition 12. Let n = 2. An SCS F ∈ F satisfies the consistency-unanimity
property whenever there exist collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} ⊂ X
and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} ⊂ X such that
(i) for all f ∈ F , f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ C(θ
′
1,θ2)
1 (S1(f, θ2)) for each θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1, and
(ii) for all f ∈ F , f(θ1, θ′2) ∈ C(θ1,θ
′
2)
2 (S2(f, θ1)) for each θ
′
2 ∈ Θ2, and
(iii) for all f, f ′ ∈ F , S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ1) 6= ∅ for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2,
and there is a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S1∪ S2 S ⊆ X¯ such that for any
collection of product sets {Θ¯f}f ∈F with Θ¯ =
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f ⊂ Θ,
(iv) F respects choice unanimity on X¯ and S1 and S2 at every θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, and
(v) for all f ∈ F and deception profile α, if f(α(θ)) 6= f ∗(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯f where
f ∗ is the SCF that satisfies (i)–(iii) of choice unanimity, then there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f
such that either f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f, α2(θ∗2))) or f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f, α1(θ∗1))).
Consistency-unanimity, in words, requires the following:47 Given a non-empty SCS
F , there exist collections of sets Si with the property that Si(f, θj) does not depend on
47Consistency-unanimity entails choice unanimity conditions that are similar in spirit to (iv) of Con-
dition µ2 and (i)− (b) of Condition β. For more on them, please see Footnote 45.
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θi for all i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j and f ∈ F and θj ∈ Θj and a set of alternatives X¯ which
contains every alternative that appears in S1 ∪ S2 such that the following hold:
— Given any i ∈ {1, 2} and any f ∈ F and any θj ∈ Θj, it must be that i’s choice
when he/she is of type θ′i at state (θ
′
i, θj) contains f(θ
′
i, θj) for all θ
′
i ∈ Θi, with
j = 1, 2 and i 6= j; and
— any set from S1 must have a common element with any set from S2; and
— for any collection of product sets of states {Θ¯f}f ∈F with Θ¯ =
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f ⊂ Θ, there
is an SCF f ∗ in F such that
– F respects choice unanimity on X¯ and S1 and S2 whenever θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯; and
– for any deception profile α and SCF f ∈ F that lead to an outcome different
than f ∗(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯f where f ∗ is the SCF that satisfies the choice
unanimity conditions (i)–(iii), there exists a whistle-blower i∗ ∈ {1, 2} and
an informant state θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f such that i∗ does not choose at θ∗ the alternative
f(α(θ∗)) from Si∗(f, αj(θ∗j )) where j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i∗.
Below we establish that the consistency-unanimity property is sufficient for ex-post
implementation with two individuals. Indeed, it is a novel two-individual condition which
draws its motivation from three or more individuals sufficiency conditions, consistency-
no-veto of the current paper, monotonicity-no-veto of Jackson (1991), and ex post mono-
tonicity no veto of Bergemann and Morris (2008).
Theorem 6. Let n = 2. If an SCS F ∈ F satisfies the consistency-unanimity property,
then F is ex-post implementable.
We wish to emphasize that when F = {f}, i.e., the case in which the planner is
seeking to implement an SCF in EPE, then, (iii) of choice unanimity holds vacuously.48
This simplifies the hypothesis of Theorem 6 and delivers the following:
Corollary 2. Let n = 2. An SCF f : Θ → X is ex-post implementable whenever there
are collections of sets Si := {Si(f, θj)|θj ∈ Θj} ⊂ X with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j such that
(i) f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ C(θ
′
1,θ2)
1 (S1(f, θ2)) for each θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1, and f(θ1, θ′2) ∈ C(θ1,θ
′
2)
2 (S2(f, θ1))
for each θ′2 ∈ Θ2, and S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f, θ1) 6= ∅ for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2,
48We note that when F = {f}, Rule 3 of the mechanism presented in Section A.2 becomes redundant.
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and there is a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S1∪ S2 S ⊆ X¯ such that for any product
set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ,
(ii) x ∈ Cθ1(X¯) ∩ Cθ2(X¯) implies f(θ) = x, x ∈ Cθ1(T ) ∩ Cθ2(X¯) with T ∈ S1 implies
f(θ) = x, and x ∈ Cθ1(X¯) ∩ Cθ2(T ′) with T ′ ∈ S2 implies f(θ) = x, for each
θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, and
(iii) for any deception profile α, if f(α(θ)) 6= f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯, then there exists θ∗ ∈
Θ¯ such that either f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f, α2(θ∗2))) or f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f, α1(θ∗1))).
In what follows, we briefly elaborate on the relation of our motivating example to
the sufficiency results we provide for the case of two individuals. The individual choices
of Alice and Bob specified in Table 1 and collections of sets SA and SB satisfying neither
consistency-no-veto nor consistency-unanimity (see Definitions 8 and 12, respectively)
establish that our sufficiency conditions for the case of two individuals are not necessary
in general, as expected. To see why, consider the individual choices of Alice from the
set SA(f, ρB) = {c, n}, and of Bob from the set X¯ = {c, n, s} at state (γA, γB).49 Alice
chooses n from SA(f, ρB), whereas Bob chooses both n and s from the set X¯ at (γA, γB).
As n is chosen by both, choice incompatibility fails at (γA, γB). Thus, we should turn to
choice unanimity to be able to employ the mechanism of Section A.2 to deliver sufficiency.
However, there is no SCF f ∗ ∈ F in the SCS F such that f ∗(γA, γB) = n. Therefore,
choice unanimity as well as choice incompatibility on (X¯, SA) fail and hence we can
employ neither Theorem 5 nor Theorem 6.
To demonstrate the relevance and applicability of our sufficiency results, below, we
show how one of them, Corollary 2, can be employed on an example that is inspired
from Masatlioglu and Ok (2014).50
Suppose that the states of the world regarding the individual choices of Alice and
Bob are given by Θ = {(♦,♦), (♦, c), (c,♦), (c, c)}. That is, ΘA = ΘB = {♦, c}, where
type ♦ stands for not having a status-quo and type c stands for status-quo being coal.
We consider the individual choices of Alice and Bob from (the subsets) of X = {c, n, s}
as specified in Table 9.
49By following the same line of arguments made in the discussions immediately following Theorem
4, one can show that (i)–(iii) of both consistency-no-veto and consistency-unanimity determine five
members of such collections of sets of Alice and Bob: SA must be such that SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s},
SA(f
′, ρB) = {c, s}, and SA(f ′, γB) = {c, s}; and SB must be such that SB(f, ρA) = {c, n}, and
SB(f, γA) = {n, s}. Consequently, X¯ = {c, n, s} because X¯ ⊆ X = {c, n, s}.
50Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) presents a “model of individual decision making when the endowment
of an agent provides a reference point that may influence her choices”.
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S C
(♦,♦)
A C
(♦,♦)
B C
(♦,c)
A C
(♦,c)
B C
(c,♦)
A C
(c,♦)
B C
(c,c)
A C
(c,c)
B
{c, n, s} {s} {s} {s} {n} {n} {s} {n} {n}
{c, n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n}
{c, s} {s} {s} {s} {c} {c} {s} {c} {c}
{n, s} {s} {s} {s} {s} {s} {s} {n} {n}
Table 9: A two-individual example satisfying consistency-unanimity.
A social planner wants to ex-post implement the SCF f , a particular selection from
the BR-optimal outcomes, described in Table 10: The social planner breaks the tie in
favor of s whenever n and s are both BR-optimal.
State (♦,♦) (♦, c) (c,♦) (c, c)
BR-optimal {s} {n, s} {n, s} {n}
f {s} {s} {s} {n}
Table 10: BR-optimal alternatives and SCF f .
Indeed, the planer can employ the mechanism described in Section A.2 to implement
the SCF f in ex-post equilibrium: In Section C of the Appendix, we show that the
collections SA := {SA(f,♦), SA(f, c)} and SB := {SB(f,♦), SB(f, c)} with SA(f,♦) =
{n, s}, SA(f, c) = {c, n, s} and SB(f,♦) = {n, s}, SB(f, c) = {c, n, s} satisfy conditions
(i), (ii), and (iii) of Corollary 2.51
7 Simple Mechanisms
There has been a recent interest in simple mechanisms in the mechanism design lit-
erature.52 Indeed, dealing with individuals having limited cognitive abilities increases
the relevance and importance of the simplicity of mechanisms. In this section, we elabo-
rate on the simplicity of mechanisms that can be used for ex-post implementation when
individuals’ choices do not necessarily satisfy the standard axioms of rationality.
In our view, given that the individuals under consideration are susceptible to behav-
ioral biases, a designer should choose a consistent collection of sets that gives rise to the
simplest mechanism, one in which the number of messages is as low as possible. The
following analysis provides insights regarding simplicity in this regard.
51We note that Rule 3 of the mechanism described in Section A.2 becomes redundant when ex-post
implementation of an SCF is desired.
52See for example, Li (2017) and Borgers and Li (2018).
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7.1 Motivating example revisited
We start with the mechanism we employ in our motivating example presented in
Section 3.1 in Table 4, which ex-post implements the SCS described in Table 3 for the
individual choices of Alice and Bob as specified in Table 1. In particular, we discuss why
there does not exist any simpler mechanism that implements that SCS in EPE.
To see why, consider the discussion on page 25 and recall that two-individual consis-
tency (see Definition 9) pins down 5 of 8 members of such collections of sets of Alice and
Bob: SA must be such that SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s}, SA(f ′, ρB) = {c, s}, and SA(f ′, γB) =
{c, s}; and SB must be such that SB(f, ρA) = {c, n}, and SB(f, γA) = {n, s}.
Fortunately, it is possible to see that our mechanism, presented in Table 4, is one of
the simplest mechanisms that ex-post implements F without any need to further narrow
down SA and SB by employing condition (iv) of two-individual consistency.
As SA(f, γB) must be {c, n, s}, Alice must have at least three messages to be able
to generate this opportunity set in any mechanism that ex-post implements F . Fur-
thermore, Bob must have at least two messages: one for Alice to be able to gener-
ate {c, n, s} and another for Alice to be able to generate {c, s} since we must have
SA(f
′, ρB) = SA(f ′, γB) = {c, s}. Therefore, the best we can hope for is three messages
for Alice and two messages for Bob.
Below, we explain why we need at least one more message. Suppose that there
exists a mechanism that ex-post implements the SCS F where Alice has three messages
and Bob has two messages. This means we must have SA(f, ρB) = {c, n, s} and both
SB(f
′, ρA) and SB(f ′, γA) must be either {c, n} or {n, s}. Therefore, the collections
SA = {{c, n, s}, {c, s}} and SB = {{c, n}, {n, s}, SB(f ′, ρA), SB(f ′, γA)} hint to us that
the mechanism should look like the game form given in Table 11. In this mechanism,
Bob
Alice
{c, n, s} {c, s}
{c, n} x c
{n, s} y s
{t, z} z t
Table 11: A 3× 2 mechanism proposal for Alice and Bob.
the messages are labeled with the opportunity sets that the other individual should
be able to generate. This is because any message in a mechanism can be thought of
as an opportunity set generated for the other individual. For example, if Bob sends
the message on the left, then Alice should be able to generate the set {c, n, s}. Thus,
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{x, y, z} = {c, n, s} and, hence, x 6= y 6= z. If Bob sends the message on the right, then
Alice should be able to obtain {c, s}, the other set in SA. On the other hand, if Alice
sends the message on top, then Bob should be able to generate {c, n}, and if Alice sends
the message in the middle, Bob should be able to generate {n, s}. Furthermore, each
outcome specified in the mechanism must be in both of the sustained opportunity sets
of each individual. In particular, if Alice sends {c, n} (sustaining the opportunity set
{c, n} ∈ SB for Bob) and Bob sends {c, s} (sustaining the opportunity set {c, s} ∈ SA
for Alice), the outcome must be c as {c, n} ∩ {c, s} = {c}. So, for Bob to be able to
generate {c, n}, the outcome must be n whenever Alice sends {c, n} and Bob {c, n, s}.
Similarly, the outcome must equal s if Alice sends {n, s} and Bob {c, s} and hence the
outcome must equal n whenever Alice sends {n, s} and Bob {c, n, s}. Thus, we must
have x = n = y, a contradiction to x 6= y. Thus, the simplest mechanism cannot have
three messages for Alice and two for Bob. It must have at least one more message. This
makes the mechanism given in Table 4 one of the simplest mechanisms that ex-post
implements the SCS F described in Table 3 . We note this observation as a corollary:
Corollary 3. Given the individual choices of Alice and Bob in Table 1, any mechanism
that ex-post implements the SCS F described in Table 3 must have at least three messages
for Alice and the total number of messages for both players must be at least six. In this
regard, there does not exist any simpler mechanism than the one given in Table 4.
We note that the mechanism given in Table 4 is not the unique simplest mechanism
that works for our motivating example: the mechanism given in Table 12 also ex-post
implements the SCS F for the individual choices as specified in Table 1.53
Bob
Alice
L M R
U n c n
M c c c
D n s s
Table 12: Another simplest mechanism for Alice and Bob.
7.2 Lower bounds on the number of messages
In the proof of Theorem 1, the collection of sets S = {Si(f, θ−i)|f ∈ F, i ∈ N, θ−i ∈
Θ−i} consistent with the SCS F is constructed from the mechanism that ex-post imple-
ments F . When there are multiple such mechanisms, there could be possibly different
53The only difference from the mechanism defined in Table 4 is SB(f
′, ρA) = {c}, instead of {c, s}.
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collections of sets consistent with the same SCS. How many sets there are in a collec-
tion, and how small these sets are, turn out to be important when designing simple
mechanisms.
The observations made in Section 7.1 lead us to lower bounds on the number of
messages needed for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. In fact,
we observe that collections {Si}i∈N that satisfy two-individual consistency formalized in
Definition 9 for the case of two individuals (and consistency specified in Definition 3 for
the case of three or more individuals) provide the key for obtaining these lower bounds.
Let {Sγ}γ∈Γ be the set of all the collections of sets that satisfy consistency (or two-
individual consistency for the case of two individuals) represented by Sγ = {Sγi }i∈N for
each γ ∈ Γ with Sγi = {Sγi (f, θ−i)|f ∈ F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i}. Clearly, the goal of the planner is
to pick up one of these collections and design a mechanism that ex-post implements F .
In our final result, below, we provide lower bounds for the simplicity of mechanisms
that are employed for ex-post implementation:
Theorem 7. In any mechanism that ex-post implements the SCS F ∈ F ,
(i) the minimum number of messages required for individual i is minγ∈Γ maxS∈Sγi #S,
(ii) the minimum number of message profiles required for the individuals other than i
is minγ∈Γ #Sγi , and
(iii) the minimum number of total messages required for all individuals is
max
{
minγ∈Γ maxi∈N [#Sγi + maxS∈Sγi #S],minγ∈Γ
∑
i∈N maxS∈Sγi #S
}
.
The intuition behind Theorem 7 is simple: If the collection Sγ happens to be the
collection of opportunity sets generated by the mechanism that ex-post implements F ,
then individual i is able to generate any set in Sγi . Therefore, individual i must have at
least as many messages as the cardinality of the maximal set in Sγi , which implies (i).
At the same time, for each different set in the collection Sγi , there must exist a
particular message profile of the individuals other than i that should allow individual i
to generate this particular set, which implies (ii).
Therefore, if the collection Sγ happens to be the collection of opportunity sets gener-
ated by the mechanism that ex-post implements F , then the total number of messages
in this mechanism must be at least as much as maxi∈N [#Sγi + maxS∈Sγi #S]. On the
other hand, by (i), the total number of messages required in this mechanism for all the
individuals must be also more than
∑
i∈N maxS∈Sγi #S for the particular collection S
γ
i .
Combining together, the total number of messages must exceed both minγ∈Γ maxi∈N
[#Sγi + maxS∈Sγi #S] and minγ∈Γ
∑
i∈N maxS∈Sγi #S, which implies (iii).
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8 Concluding Remarks
We investigate the problem of implementation under incomplete information when
individuals’ choices need not satisfy the standard axioms of rationality.
The focus is on full implementation in ex-post equilibrium because (i) the revelation
principle fails for partial implementation and, hence, one cannot restrict attention to
direct revelation mechanisms without a loss of generality; and (ii) the concept of ex-post
equilibrium is belief-free, does not require any expectation considerations or any belief
updating, and is robust to informational assumptions regarding the environment, which
makes it well suited when individuals’ choices fail the standard axioms of rationality.
We provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for the case of three or more
individuals and for the case of two individuals separately. Even though, the mechanisms
offered in the proofs of our sufficiency theorems can be criticized for not being sufficiently
simple, our necessary conditions provide us with hints regarding the limits of simplicity
for behavioral implementation under incomplete information.
An interesting direction for future research would be to analyze whether practical
and simple mechanisms are available for specific types of behavioral biases. We hope
that our results pave the way for contributions in this direction.
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A Mechanisms
A.1 Mechanism for the case with three or more individuals
The mechanism we construct for the case with three or more individuals has a stan-
dard structure and makes use of the following observations: (i) the outcome should be
f(θ) when there is unanimous agreement between the individuals over f ∈ F and the
true state is θ; (ii) under such a unanimous agreement each individual j should be able
to generate unilaterally the set Sj(f, θ−j), i.e., when all other individuals (all i 6= j)
have unanimously decided on the particular SCF f ∈ F and sending messages as if their
types are θ−j ∈ Θ−j, j should be able to generate Sj(f, θ−j); (iii) whenever there is an
attempt to deceive the designer so that an outcome not compatible with the SCS is to
be implemented, a whistle-blower should be able to alert the designer; (iv) undesirable
EPE should be eliminated according to some procedure, e.g., by a modulo game or an
integer game.54
Consider an SCS F ∈ F for which the collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i) : i ∈ N, f ∈
F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} and X¯ are as specified in Theorem 2 or Theorem 3. For any i ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
θ−i ∈ Θ−i, let x¯(i, f, θ−i) be an arbitrary alternative in Si(f, θ−i).55
The mechanism µ = (M, g) is defined as follows: The message space of each individual
i ∈ N is Mi = F ×Θi× X¯×N , while a generic message is denoted by mi = (f, θi, xi, ki),
and the outcome function g : M → X is as specified in Table 13.
Rule 1 : g(m) = f(θ) if mi = (f, θi, ·, ·) for all i ∈ N,
Rule 2 : g(m) =
{
xj if xj ∈ Sj(f, θ−j),
x¯(j, f, θ−j) otherwise.
if mi = (f, θi, ·, ·) for all i ∈ N \ {j}
and mj = (f˜, θ˜j, xj, ·) with f˜ 6= f,
Rule 3 : g(m) = xj where j =
∑
i ki (mod n) otherwise.
Table 13: The outcome function of the mechanism with three or more individuals.
In words, each individual is required to send a message that specifies an SCF f ∈ F ,
a type for himself θi ∈ Θi, an alternative xi in X¯, and a number ki ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.56
54We note that the mechanism we construct has a standard structure in the sense that it is similar
to those that have been widely used for sufficiency proofs in the implementation literature. See for
example, Repullo (1987), Saijo (1988), Moore and Repullo (1990), Jackson (1991), Danilov (1992),
Maskin (1999), Bergemann and Morris (2008), de Clippel (2014), Koray and Yildiz (2018), among many
others. Similar mechanisms are sometimes referred to as augmented mechanisms, integer mechanisms
or canonical mechanisms. Indeed, we are puzzled why there is not a consensus over a specific name in
the literature.
55Such an x¯(i, f, θ−i) exists simply because Si(f, θ−i) must be non-empty due to (i) of consistency.
56We would like to emphasize that since X¯ contains Si(f, θ−i) for each i ∈ N , f ∈ F , θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
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Rule 1 indicates that if there is unanimity among the individuals’ messages regarding
the SCF to be implemented, then the outcome is determined according to this SCF and
the reported type profile in the messages. Rule 2 indicates that if there is agreement
between all the individuals but one regarding the SCF f ∈ F in their messages, then
the outcome is determined according to the alternative proposed by the odd-man-out,
j, only if this alternative is in Sj(f, θ−j), otherwise the outcome is x¯(j, f, θ−j) which
is in Sj(f, θ−j) as well. That is, as desired, when all the other individuals (all i 6= j)
have unanimously decided on the particular SCF f ∈ F and sending messages as if their
types are θ−j ∈ Θ−j, the odd-man-out j is able to generate unilaterally Sj(f, θ−j)—and
nothing else since x¯(i, f, θ−i) ∈ Sj(f, θ−j) as well. Finally, Rule 3 applies when both
Rule 1 and Rule 2 fail, then the outcome is determined only according to the reported
numbers (ki’s) and the outcome xj is implemented where j is the individual
∑
i ki modulo
n. Rule 3 makes sure that there are no undesirable EPE of the mechanism.57
A.2 Mechanism for the case with two individuals
The mechanism we design for the case of two individuals relies on the following
observations: (i) the outcome should be f(θ) when there is agreement between the two
individuals over f ∈ F and the true state is θ; (ii) each individual i should be able to
generate unilaterally the set Si(f, θj) when the other individual j 6= i intends a particular
SCF f ∈ F and sends a message as if his/her type is θj ∈ Θj; (iii) whenever there is
an attempt to deceive the designer so that an undesired outcome is to be implemented,
a whistle-blower should be able to alert the designer; (iv) undesirable EPE should be
eliminated according to a procedure, e.g., a modulo game or an integer game.
Consider any F ∈ F for which S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2}, S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈
F, θ1 ∈ Θ1}, and X¯ are as specified in Theorem 5 or Theorem 6.
For any i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, f ∈ F , θj ∈ Θj, let x¯(i, f, θj) be an arbitrary
alternative in Si(f, θj).
58
For any f, f ′ ∈ F , θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2, let x¯(f, f ′, θ1, θ2) be an arbitrary alter-
native in S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ1). Such an alternative x¯(f, f ′, θ1, θ2) ∈ X¯ exists since
S1(f, θ2)∩S2(f ′, θ1) is non-empty for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2, by (iii) of two-individual
consistency (see Definition 9).
any alternative that is not in X¯ is non-essential for the design problem. Note that such an alternative
is not going to be in the opportunity set of any individuals and it is never to be implemented.
57We note that we need at least three individuals for our mechanism to be well defined. Otherwise,
Rule 2 in the mechanism becomes ambiguous.
58Such an x¯(i, f, θj) exists as Si(f, θj) is non-empty due to (i) and (ii) of two-individual consistency.
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The mechanism we employ is denoted by µ = (M, g) where the message space of
individual i is Mi = {0, 1} × F × Θi × X¯ × {0, 1} and the outcome function equals
g : M → X. A generic message is denoted by mi = (ni, fi, θi, xi, ki). That is, each
individual message’s first entry and last entry is required to be either 0 or 1, and each
individual i is required to send a message that specifies an SCF f ∈ F , a type θi ∈ Θi,
an alternative xi ∈ X¯.59 The outcome function g is specified in Table 14.
Rule 1 : g(m) = f(θ)
if mi = (0, f, θi, ·, ·)
for both i ∈ {1, 2},
Rule 2.1 : g(m) =
{
x1 if x1 ∈ S1(f2, θ2)
x¯(1, f2, θ2) otherwise,
if m1 = (1, f1, θ1, x1, ·) and
m2 = (0, f2, θ2, x2, ·),
Rule 2.2 : g(m) =
{
x2 if x2 ∈ S2(f1, θ1)
x¯(2, f1, θ1) otherwise,
if m1 = (0, f1, θ1, x1, ·) and
m2 = (1, f2, θ2, x2, ·),
Rule 3 : g(m) = x¯(f1, f2, θ1, θ2)
if m1 = (0, f1, θ1, x1, k1) and
m2 = (0, f2, θ2, x2, k2) with
f1 6= f2,
Rule 4 : g(m) = xj
if m1 = (1, f1, θ1, x1, k1) and
m2 = (1, f2, θ2, x2, k2) with
j =
{
1 if k1 + k2 is odd,
2 if k1 + k2 is even.
Table 14: The outcome function of the two individual mechanism.
Rule 1 indicates that if the first entries of both individuals’ messages are 0 and there
is agreement between the two individuals’ messages regarding the SCF, then the outcome
is determined according to this SCF and the reported type profile in the messages.
Rule 2.1 and Rule 2.2 indicate that if the first entry of the individual messages do not
coincide, then the outcome is the alternative proposed by individual i whose message’s
first entry is 1 whenever this alternative is in Si(fj, θj) where j 6= i is the individual
whose message’s first entry is 0. Otherwise, the outcome is x¯(i, fj, θj), also in Si(fj, θj).
Rule 3.1 and Rule 3.2 indicate that whenever the first entries of both individuals’
messages are 0 but there is no agreement between the individuals’ messages regarding
the SCF, i.e., f1 6= f2, the outcome is x¯(f1, f2, θ1, θ2) ∈ S1(f2, θ2) ∩ S2(f1, θ1), which is
non-empty due to (iii) of two-individual consistency.
59In our mechanism, the first entry of the message of individual i, ni ∈ {0, 1} with i = 1, 2, parallels
with the “flag” or “no flag” choice featured in the mechanism of Dutta and Sen (1991).
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Rule 4 indicates that if the first entries of both individuals’ messages are 1, then the
outcome is determined according to the sum of the last entries of the messages. If this
sum is odd, then the outcome is the alternative proposed by individual 1 and if this sum
is even, the outcome is the alternative proposed by individual 2.
When ex-post implementation of an SCF is desired, i.e., #F = 1, then (iii) of choice
incompatibility holds vacuously while Rule 3 of our mechanism becomes redundant. This
simplifies our proofs by eliminating discussions and arguments about Rule 3.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Claim 1
We identify all EPE of µ = (M, g) by a case by case analysis on what Alice plays
when her type is ρA. Let σ
∗ be an ex-post equilbirium of µ = (M, g).
Case 1. If σ∗A(ρA) = U : Then, O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(ρA)) = {c, n}. At (ρA, ρB) and (ρA, γB), Bob
chooses n from the set {c, n}. Thus, σ∗B(ρB) and σ∗B(γB) must be either L or R.
Subcase 1.1. If σ∗B(ρB) = L and σ
∗
B(γB) = L: Then, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = n = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, n}. At (γA, ρB), Alice chooses n from {c, n}
and hence σ∗A(γA) must be either U or D. But, at (γA, γB), Alice chooses c from {c, n}
which implies σ∗A(γA) must be M , a contradiction. Thus, we cannot have σ
∗
B(ρB) = L
and σ∗B(γB) = L.
Subcase 1.2. If σ∗B(ρB) = L and σ
∗
B(γB) = R: Then, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = n = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = {c, n} and OµA(σ∗B(γB)) = {c, n, s}. At (γA, ρB), Alice chooses n
from {c, n}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be either U or D. At (γA, γB), Alice chooses c
and s from {c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be M or D. Therefore, we must have
σ∗A(γA) = D.
Indeed the following observations imply that our first EPE is σ′∗ such that σ′∗A(ρA) =
U , σ′∗A(γA) = D, and σ
′∗
B(ρB) = L, σ
′∗
B(γB) = R
At (ρA, ρB) : n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′∗B(ρB))),
n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′∗A(ρA))).
At (ρA, γB) : n ∈ C(ρA,γB)A ({c, n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (OµA(σ′∗B(γB))),
n ∈ C(ρA,γB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)B (OµB(σ′∗A(ρA))).
At (γA, ρB) : n ∈ C(γA,ρB)A ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′∗B(ρB))),
n ∈ C(γA,ρB)B ({n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′∗A(γA))).
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At (γA, γB) : s ∈ C(γA,γB)A ({c, n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)A (OµA(σ′∗B(γB))),
s ∈ C(γA,γB)B ({n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)B (OµB(σ′∗A(γA))).
Subcase 1.3. If σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = L: Then, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = n = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = {c, n, s} and OµA(σ∗B(γB)) = {c, n}. At (γA, ρB), Alice chooses n
from {c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U . On the other hand, at (γA, γB), Alice
chooses n from {c, n}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U or D. Therefore, we must have
σ∗A(γA) = U . This implies O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(γA)) = {c, n}. But, at (γA, ρB), Bob chooses c from
{c, n} even though it would be g(σ∗(γA, ρB)) = n. Hence, we cannot have σ∗B(ρB) = R
and σ∗B(γB) = L.
Subcase 1.4. If σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = R: Then, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = n = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, n, s}. At (γA, ρB), Alice chooses n from
{c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U . But, at (γA, γB), Alice chooses c and s from
{c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be either M or D, a contradiction. Therefore, we
cannot have σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = R.
Case 2. If σ∗A(ρA) = M : Then, O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(ρA)) = {c, s}. At (ρA, ρB) and (ρA, γB), Bob
chooses s from the set {c, s}. Therefore, σ∗B(ρB) and σ∗B(γB) must both be M . Then,
OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, s}. At (γA, ρB) and (γA, γB) Alice chooses c from the
set {c, s}, which implies it must be that σ∗A(ρA) = U .
Indeed the following observations imply that our second EPE is σ′′′∗ such that
σ′′′∗A (ρA) = M , σ
′′′∗
A (γA) = U , and σ
′′′∗
B (ρB) = M , σ
′′′∗
B (γB) = M
At (ρA, ρB) : s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′′′∗B (ρB))),
s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′′′∗A (ρA))).
At (ρA, γB) : s ∈ C(ρA,γB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (OµA(σ′′′∗B (γB))),
s ∈ C(ρA,γB)B ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)B (OµB(σ′′′∗A (ρA))).
At (γA, ρB) : c ∈ C(γA,ρB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′′′∗B (ρB))),
c ∈ C(γA,ρB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′′′∗A (γA))).
At (γA, γB) : c ∈ C(γA,γB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)A (OµA(σ′′′∗B (γB))),
c ∈ C(γA,γB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)B (OµB(σ′′′∗A (γA))).
Case 3. If σ∗A(ρA) = D: Then, O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(ρA)) = {n, s}. At (ρA, ρB) and (ρA, γB), Bob
chooses s from the set {n, s}. Therefore, σ∗B(ρB) and σ∗B(γB) must be either M or R.
Subcase 3.1. If σ∗B(ρB) = M and σ
∗
B(γB) = M : So, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = s = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
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We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, s}. At (γA, ρB) and (γA, γB), Alice chooses c
from {c, s}, which implies it must be σ∗A(γA) = U .
Indeed the following observations imply that our third EPE is σ′′∗ such that σ′′∗A (ρA) =
D, σ′′∗A (γA) = U , and σ
′′∗
B (ρB) = M , σ
′′∗
B (γB) = M .
At (ρA, ρB) : s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′′∗B (ρB))),
s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B ({n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′′∗A (ρA))).
At (ρA, γB) : s ∈ C(ρA,γB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (OµA(σ′′∗B (γB))),
s ∈ C(ρA,γB)B ({n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)B (OµB(σ′′∗A (ρA))).
At (γA, ρB) : c ∈ C(γA,ρB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′′∗B (ρB))),
c ∈ C(γA,ρB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′′∗A (γA))).
At (γA, γB) : c ∈ C(γA,γB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)A (OµA(σ′′∗B (γB))),
c ∈ C(γA,γB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)B (OµB(σ′′∗A (γA))).
Subcase 3.2. If σ∗B(ρB) = M and σ
∗
B(γB) = R: So, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = s = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = {c, s} and OµA(σ∗B(γB)) = {c, n, s}. At (γA, ρB), Alice chooses
c from {c, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U . On the other hand, at (γA, γB), Alice
chooses c and s from {c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be M or D, a contradiction.
Hence, we cannot have σ∗B(ρB) = M and σ
∗
B(γB) = R.
Subcase 3.3. If σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = M : So, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = s = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = {c, n, s} and OµA(σ∗B(γB)) = {c, s}. At (γA, ρB), Alice chooses n
from {c, n, s}, and at (γA, γB), Alice chooses c from {c, n}. They both imply we must
have σ∗A(γA) = U . Thus, O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(γA)) = {c, n}. But, at (γA, ρB), Bob chooses c from
{c, n} even though it would be g(σ∗(γA, ρB)) = n. So, we cannot have σ∗B(ρB) = R and
σ∗B(γB) = M .
Subcase 3.4. If σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = R: So, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = s = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, n, s}. At (γA, ρB), Alice chooses n from
{c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U . On the other hand, at (γA, γB), Alice chooses
c, s from {c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be M or D, a contradiction. Thus, we
cannot have σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = R as well.
Therefore, there are exactly three EPE of the mechanism µ = (M, g), σ′∗, σ′′∗, and
σ′′′∗, as identified above where g(σ′′∗(θ)) = g(σ′′′∗(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ: g(σ′′∗(ρA, ρB)) =
g((D,M)) = g((M,M)) = s = g(σ′′′∗(ρA, ρB)); g(σ′′∗(ρA, γB)) = g((D,M)) = g((M,M)) =
s = g(σ′′′∗(ρA, γB)); g(σ′′∗(γA, ρB)) = g((U,M)) = c = g(σ′′′∗(γA, ρB)); and g(σ′′∗(γA, γB)) =
g((U,M)) = c = g(σ′′′∗(γA, γB)).
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B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Let µ = (M, g) be a mechanism that ex-post implements the non-empty SCS F ∈ F .
Consider any SCF f ∈ F . By (i) of Definition 2, there exists an EPE σf of µ such that
f = g ◦ σf .
By definition of EPE, we have for each θ ∈ Θ, g(σf (θ)) is an element of Cθi (Oµi (σf−i(θ−i)))
for all i ∈ N . Therefore, for each θ ∈ Θ, f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (σf−i(θ−i))) for all i ∈ N . Setting
Si(f, θ−i) := O
µ
i (σ
f
−i(θ−i)), we get for each θ ∈ Θ, f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)) for all i ∈ N .
Since f ∈ F is arbitrary, this means for each f ∈ F , i ∈ N , θ−i ∈ Θ−i, there exists
Si(f, θ−i) ⊂ X such that f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)) as long as θ is compatible with θ−i, i.e.,
θ = (θ′i, θ−i) for some θ
′
i ∈ Θi. Therefore, f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi
holds for every set in the collection {Si(f, θ−i)|f ∈ F, i ∈ N, θ−i ∈ Θ−i}.
On the other hand, if a deception profile α is such that f ◦α /∈ F , σf ◦α cannot be an
EPE of µ = (M, g). Otherwise, by (ii) of Definition 2, there exists f˜ ∈ F with f˜ = g◦σf◦
α. But, since f = g ◦σf , we have f˜ = f ◦α ∈ F , a contradiction. Therefore, there exists
θ∗ ∈ Θ, i∗ ∈ N such that g(σf (α(θ∗))) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Oµi∗(σf−i∗(α−i∗(θ−i∗)))). Since g◦σf = f and
Oµi∗(σ
f
−i∗(α−i∗(θ−i∗))) = Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ−i∗)), we get f(α(θ
∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ−i∗))).
B.3 Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 and Lemma 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Let S be a non-empty collection of sets consistent with an SCS
F under incomplete information and let S∗ := Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ−i∗)) ∈ S. Then, condition (i)
of ex-post choice monotonicity follows from condition (ii) of Definition 3 while condition
(ii) of ex-post choice monotonicity follows from (i) of Definition 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let S be a non-empty collection of sets consistent with an SCS
F under incomplete information and take any f ∈ F , θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N and let S :=
Si(f, θ−i) ∈ S. By (i) of Definition 3, f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)) implies f(θ) ∈ Cθi (S)
establishing condition (i) of quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility. Furthermore,
since f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi due to (i) of Definition 3, we
have f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ S for each θ′i ∈ Θi establishing condition (ii) of quasi-ex-post choice
incentive compatibility.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof directly follows from the fact that whenever f is partially
truthfully (ex-post) implemented by the direct mechanism gd : Θ→ X, the opportunity
set of any individual i ∈ N under truthtelling is {f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}, i.e., Og
d
i (θ−i) =
{f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose the individual choices satisfy the IIA and let f be par-
tially (ex-post) implemented by the mechanism µ. Then, Theorem 1 together with
Proposition 2 implies that f is quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatible. That is, for ev-
ery θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N there exists S ∈ X such that f(θ) ∈ Cθi (S) and {f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi} ⊆ S.
Hence, by the IIA, we must have f(θ) ∈ Cθi ({f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}). Therefore, by Lemma
1, the revelation principle holds.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) constructed in section A.1.
First, we show that for any f ∈ F , there exists an EPE, σf , of µ = (M, g) such that
f = g ◦ σf . This implies that condition (i) of ex-post implementability (see Definition
2) holds: Take any f ∈ F , let σfi (θi) = (f, θi, x, 1) for each i ∈ N and for some arbitrary
x ∈ X¯. By Rule 1, we have g(σf (θ)) = f(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ, i.e., f = g◦σf . Observe that
for any unilateral deviation by individual i from σf , either Rule 1 or Rule 2 applies, i.e.,
Rule 3 is not attainable by any unilateral deviation from σf . If individual i deviates to
mi = (f, θi, x
′, n′) when his/her type is θi, then Rule 1 continues to apply at θ and the
outcome continues to be f(θ), which is in Si(f, θ−i) since, by condition (i) of consistency,
f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)). If individual i deviates to mi = (f, θ′i, x′, n′) with θ′i 6= θi when
his/her type is θi, then Rule 1 continues to apply at θ and the outcome at θ becomes
f(θ′i, θ−i), which is in Si(f, θ−i) as well since f(θ
′
i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)), again by
condition (i) of consistency. If individual i deviates to mi = (f
′, θ′i, x
′, n′) with f ′ 6= f
when his/her type is θi, then Rule 2 applies at θ and the outcome at θ becomes x
′ if
x′ is in Si(f, θ−i), and otherwise x¯(i, f, θ−i), which is already in Si(f, θ−i) as well. This
means, as Si(f, θ−i) ⊂ X¯ for each θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , under σf , at any θ ∈ Θ, by unilateral
deviations, individual i can generate every alternative in Si(f, θ−i) and nothing else.
That is, by construction, Oµi (σ
f
−i(θ−i)) = Si(f, θ−i) for each θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N . Since,
by (i) of consistency, f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)) for each i ∈ N , we have for each θ ∈ Θ,
g(σf (θ)) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (σf−i(θ−i))) for all i ∈ N , i.e., σf is an EPE of µ such that f = g ◦ σf .
Consider now any EPE σ∗ of µ denoted as σ∗i (θi) = (fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)) for
each i ∈ N . That is, fi(θi) denotes the SCF proposed by individual i when his/her
type is θi; αi(θi) denotes the reported type of individual i when his/her type is θi; xi(θi)
denotes the alternative proposed by individual i when his/her type is θi; and ki(θi)
denotes the number proposed by individual i when his/her type is θi.
Next, we show that, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at each θ ∈ Θ:
Suppose, for contradiction, that either Rule 2 or Rule 3 applies at some θ˜ ∈ Θ under
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σ∗. If Rule 2 applies at θ˜, by construction, we have Oµj (σ
∗
−j(θ˜−j)) = Sj(f, αj(θ˜−j)) for
the odd-man-out j ∈ N and Oµi (σ∗−i(θ˜−i)) = X¯ for all i 6= j, i.e., for all the other
n − 1 individuals. On the other hand, if Rule 3 applies at θ˜, we have, by construction,
Oµi (σ
∗
−i(θ˜−i)) = X¯ for all i ∈ N . Therefore, under both Rule 2 and Rule 3, at least
n − 1 individuals have the opportunity set X¯. Since σ∗ is an EPE of µ, it follows
that g(σ∗(θ˜)) ∈ Cθi (X¯) for at least n − 1 individuals. But this contradicts the choice
incompatible pair property of X¯ at θ˜. Therefore, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must
apply at each θ ∈ Θ.
Moreover, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, there is a unique f ∈ F such that fi(θi) = f for all
i ∈ N and for all θi ∈ Θi. To see why, fix an EPE σ∗ of µ, pick an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ, and
as Rule 1 must apply at θ ∈ Θ under σ∗, let fi(θi) = f for all i ∈ N under σ∗. Suppose,
for contradiction, that there exists i0 ∈ N , θi0 ∈ Θi0 such that fi0(θi0) 6= f . Without
loss of generality, suppose i0 = 1 and θˆ1 ∈ Θ1 such that f1(θˆ1) 6= f . But, then, under
the EPE σ∗, Rule 1 cannot apply at state (θˆ1, θ−1) ∈ Θ, as f1(θˆ1) 6= f and fj(θj) = f
for all j 6= 1 under σ∗, a contradiction.
Therefore, for any EPE σ∗ of µ, there exists a unique f ∈ F such that fi(θi) = f
for all i ∈ N and for all θi ∈ Θi. Hence, by Rule 1, g(σ∗(θ)) = f(α(θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ.
That is, g ◦ σ∗ = f ◦ α.
Finally, we show that it must be that f ◦α ∈ F : Since Rule 1 applies at each θ ∈ Θ,
and each i ∈ N reports the type αi(θi) ∈ Θi as the second entry of their messages at
θ ∈ Θ under σ∗, by construction, we have, at each θ ∈ Θ, Oµi (σ∗−i(θ−i)) = Si(f, α−i(θ−i))
for all i ∈ N . If f ◦ α /∈ F , then by (ii) of consistency (see Definition 3), there
exists θ∗ ∈ Θ, i∗ ∈ N such that f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ−i∗))). But this implies
g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Oµi∗(σ∗−i∗(θ∗−i∗))), a contradiction to σ∗ being an EPE of µ. That is, we
must have f ◦ α ∈ F , as desired. Therefore, g ◦ σ∗ = f ◦ α ∈ F , which implies that
condition (ii) of ex-post implementability holds as well.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) constructed in section A.1.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, for any f ∈ F , σfi (θi) = (f, θi, x, 1) for each
i ∈ N (for arbitrary x ∈ X¯) is an EPE of µ such that f = g ◦σf . That is, for any f ∈ F ,
there exists an EPE, σf , of µ such that f = g ◦ σf , which implies that condition (i) of
ex-post implementability (refer to Definition 2) holds.
Now, consider an EPE σ∗ of µ = (M, g) represented as before by σ∗(θi) = (fi(θi),
αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)). For any f ∈ F and i ∈ N , let Θ¯fi := {θi ∈ Θi|fi(θi) = f}.
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That is, Θ¯fi ⊂ Θ¯i is the set of types of individual i where the first entry of his/her
message—his/her proposed SCF—is f under σ∗. Let Θ¯f := ×i∈NΘ¯fi . That is, Θ¯f is the
set of states where all of the individuals propose the SCF f ∈ F under σ∗. Consider
the collection of product sets {Θ¯f}f∈F . Observe that Θ¯ :=
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f describes the set of
states where Rule 1 applies under σ∗.
Thus, at any θ ∈ Θ\ Θ¯, either Rule 2 or Rule 3 applies, which means Oµi (σ∗−i(θ−i)) =
X¯ for at least n − 1 individuals for any θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯. Furthermore, σ∗ being an EPE of
µ implies g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (X¯) for at least n − 1 individuals. Hence, we have, by (iii) of
consistency-no-veto (see Definition 8), there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ)
for each θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯.
Next, we show that it must also be that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ¯. Suppose not,
for contradiction, then there exists θ˜ ∈ Θ¯f for some f ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜).
Since θ˜ ∈ Θ¯f , we have fi(θ˜i) = f for all i ∈ N . Thus, Rule 1 applies at θ˜ under σ∗, and
hence g(σ∗(θ˜)) = f(α(θ˜)) where α is the deception profile induced by σ∗. This means,
as g(σ∗(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜), we have f(α(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜). Then, by (iv) of consistency-no-veto,
there exists i∗ ∈ N and θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f such that f(α(θ˜)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗))). But, since
Rule 1 applies at θ˜ under σ∗, by construction, Oµi∗(σ
∗
−i∗(θ˜−i∗)) = Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ
∗
−i∗)), which
implies g(σ∗(θ˜)) /∈ Oµi∗(σ∗−i∗(θ˜−i∗)), a contradiction to σ∗ being an EPE of µ.
Therefore, g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ. That is, condition (ii) of ex-post
implementability holds as well.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Let F be ex-post implementable by µ = (M, g). For any f ∈ F , set Si(f, θj) :=
Oµi (σ
f
j (θj)) for i 6= j, where σf is the EPE of µ such that f = g ◦ σf , which exists by
(i) of ex-post implementability (see Definition 2). It is also easy to see that (i) and (ii)
follows from (i) of consistency (see Definition 3) and Theorem 1; (iv) follows from (ii)
of consistency and Theorem 1. The only new condition that requires a proof is (iii).
Take any f, f ′ ∈ F , if f = f ′, then, by (i) and (ii), f(θ1, θ2) = f ′(θ1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2)∩
S2(f
′, θ1) for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2. Suppose f 6= f ′. Recall that S1(f, θ2) :=
O1(σ
f
2 (θ2)) and S2(f
′, θ1) := O2(σ
f ′
1 (θ1)) where σ
f and σf
′
are some EPE of µ such
that f = g ◦ σf and f ′ = g ◦ σf ′ . Consider any θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2 and let m′1 =
σf
′
1 (θ1), m
′
2 = σ
f (θ2). Then, it follows from S1(f, θ2) and S2(f
′, θ1) being opportunity
sets as defined above that g(m′1,m
′
2) = g(m
′
1, σ
f
2 (θ2)) ∈ S1(f, θ2) and g(m′1,m′2) =
g(σf
′
1 (θ1),m
′
2) ∈ S2(f ′, θ1). Therefore, we must have g(m′1,m′2) = g(σf
′
1 (θ1), σ
f
2 (θ2)) ∈
S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ1).
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B.7 Proof of Theorem 5
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) constructed in section A.2.
First, we show that for any f ∈ F , there exists an EPE, σf , of the mechanism
µ = (M, g) such that f = g ◦ σf , which implies condition (i) of ex-post implementation
(see Definition 2): Take any f ∈ F , let σfi (θi) = (0, f, θi, xi, 0) for both i ∈ {1, 2} with
arbitrary xi ∈ X¯ for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, Rule 1 applies at each θ under σf . Hence,
we have g(σf (θ)) = f(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ, i.e., f = g ◦ σf . Below, we show that for each
i ∈ {1, 2}, Oi(σfj (θj)) = Si(f, θj) at each θ ∈ Θ with i 6= j.
Without loss of generality, we can focus on individual 1. Observe that f(θ) ∈ S1(f, θ2)
since, by (i) of two-individual consistency, f(θ) ∈ Cθ1(S1(f, θ2)). That is, if a unilateral
deviation by individual 1 does not change the outcome at θ, the outcome is already in
(S1(f, θ2)). On the other hand, if a unilateral deviation by individual 1 changes the
outcome at θ, then either Rule 1 or Rule 2.1 or Rule 3 applies at θ, i.e., Rule 2.2 and
Rule 4 cannot be attained by a unilateral deviation of individual 1 at any θ since the first
entry of individual 2’s message is 0 at any θ under σf . Therefore, at any θ ∈ Θ, by Rule
2.1, individual 1 can attain any outcome x ∈ S1(f, θ2) by simply changing his message
to (1, f, θ1, x, 0). Therefore, S1(f, θ2) ⊂ O1(σf2 (θ2)) for each θ ∈ Θ. To see that, at any
θ ∈ Θ, individual 1 cannot obtain any other alternative by a unilateral deviation, i.e.,
O1(σ
f
2 (θ2)) ⊂ S1(f, θ2) as well: observe that if Rule 1 continues to apply the outcome
at θ is f(θ′1, θ2) for some θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1 and f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2) as, by (i) of two-individual
consistency, f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ C(θ
′
1,θ2)
1 (S1(f, θ2)); when the otherwise part of Rule 2.1 implies,
x¯(1, f, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2); and when Rule 3 applies, x¯(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2) for each f ′ ∈ F ,
θ′1 ∈ Θ1 as well because, by construction, x¯(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1), a non-
empty set due to (iii) of two-individual consistency. That is, the mechanism is designed
such that, under σf , at any θ, by a unilateral deviation, individual 1 can obtain every
alternative in S1(f, θ2) and nothing else. Due to symmetry, the same line of proof
applies to individual 2 as well. That is, for each θ ∈ Θ, Oi(σfj (θj)) = Si(f, θj) for both
i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j.
Since, by (i) and (ii) of two-individual consistency, for both i ∈ {1, 2} and for each
θ ∈ Θ we have f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θj)), we have, for each θ ∈ Θ, g(σf (θ)) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (σfj (θj)))
for both i ∈ {1, 2}. That is, σf is an EPE of µ such that f = g ◦ σf , as desired.
Next, we show that for any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at each θ ∈ Θ. Below,
we show that other rules are ruled out one by one:
Let σ∗ be an EPE of µ denoted as σ∗i (θi) = (ni(θi), fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)), i ∈
{1, 2}. First, consider Rule 2.1 and Rule 2.2; if Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies at θ, then
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the opportunity set of individual i, whose message’s first entry is 1, equals Si(f, αj(θj)),
where αj(θj) denotes the reported type of j at θ and fj(θj) = f . On the other hand, the
opportunity set of individual j, whose message’s first entry is 0, is X¯. Hence, if Rule 2.1
or Rule 2.2 applies at θ under σ∗, g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (S) for some S = Si(f, αj(θj)) ∈ Si and
g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθj (X¯). This violates (ii) of choice incompatibility at θ.
Next, let us deal with Rule 3: If Rule 3 applies at θ, the opportunity sets of in-
dividuals i and j are of the form Si(f, αj(θj)) and Sj(f
′, αi(θi)), where f ′ = fi(θi)
and f = fj(θj) are the reported SCFs such that f 6= f ′; αi(θi) and αj(θj) are the
reported types at θ in the messages of i and j, respectively. This is due to the follow-
ing: When Rule 3 applies, g(σ∗(θ)) = x¯(f ′, f, α1(θ1), α2(θ2)) which is in Si(f, αj(θj)) ∩
Sj(f
′, αi(θi)) due to (iii) of two-individual consistency. When individual i deviates to
(1, fi(θi), αi(θi), x˜, ki(θi)) with x˜ ∈ Si(f, αj(θj)), either Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies and
the outcome is x˜. Thus, Si(f, αj(θj)) ⊂ Oµi (σ∗j (θj)). On the other hand, a deviation
of the form (1, fi(θi), αi(θi), xˆ, ki(θi)) with xˆ /∈ Si(f, αj(θj)) implies that either Rule 2.1
or Rule 2.2 applies and the outcome is x¯(i, f, αj(θj)) ∈ Si(f, αj(θj)), by construction.
The only possible deviation that leads to another outcome consists of (0, f, θ˜i, ·, ·). But
then, Rule 1 applies and the outcome equals f(θ˜i, αj(θj)) which is again in Si(f, αj(θj))
due to either (i) or (ii) of two-individual consistency. Hence, Oµi (σ
∗
j (θj)) = Si(f, αj(θj)).
Thus, if Rule 3 applies at some θ under σ∗, we must have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, αj(θj)))
and g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθj (Sj(f ′, αi(θi))) with f 6= f ′. But this violates (iii) of choice incom-
patibility at θ.
Finally, whenever Rule 4 applies, the opportunity sets of individual 1 and individual
2 under our mechanism are equal to X¯. Therefore, if Rule 4 applies at some θ under σ∗,
then we must have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (X¯) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. But this violates (i) of choice
incompatibility at θ.
Therefore, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at every θ ∈ Θ.
Now, let σ∗ be an arbitrary EPE of mechanism µ represented by σ∗(θi) = (ni(θi),
fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)). Since Rule 1 applies at every θ ∈ Θ under σ∗, there must
exist a unique f¯ ∈ F such that f1(θ1) = f2(θ2) = f¯ for every θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2.
To see why, suppose that for an arbitrary θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, as Rule 1 must apply at θ
under σ∗, f1(θ1) = f2(θ2) = f¯ but there also exists i0 ∈ {1, 2} and θi0 ∈ Θi0 such that
fi0(θi0) 6= f¯ . Without loss of generality, suppose it is individual 1 type θˆ1 ∈ Θ1 for whom
we have f1(θˆ1) 6= f¯ . But, then, Rule 1 cannot apply at (θˆ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, as f1(θˆ1) 6= f¯ and
f2(θ2) = f¯ , a contradiction to Rule 1 applying at all θ ∈ Θ under the EPE σ∗.
Since there is a unique f¯ ∈ F such that fi(θi) = f¯ for each θi ∈ Θi and i ∈ {1, 2},
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by Rule 1, g(σ∗(θ)) = f¯(α(θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ. That is, g ◦ σ∗ = f¯ ◦ α.
Furthermore, it must be that f¯ ◦ α ∈ F where α is the deception profile specified by
the EPE σ∗. To see why, observe that at any θ ∈ Θ, each individual i ∈ {1, 2} reports
his/her type as αi(θi) ∈ Θi as part of their messages under σ∗. Since Rule 1 applies
at θ, by construction, we have Oµi (σ
∗
j (αj(θj))) = Si(f¯, αj(θj)) for each i ∈ {1, 2}. If
f¯ ◦α /∈ F , then by (iv) of two-individual consistency, there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ, such that either
f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f¯, α2(θ∗2))) or f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f¯, α1(θ∗1))). Since Rule 1 applies at
θ∗ as well, we have g(σ∗(θ∗)) = f¯(α(θ∗)). Therefore, f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f¯, α2(θ∗2)))
implies g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (Oµ1 (σ∗2(θ∗2))) while f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f¯, α1(θ∗1))) implies that
g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (Oµ2 (σ∗1(θ∗1))). Both induce a contradiction to σ∗ being an EPE of µ.
Hence, we must have f¯◦α ∈ F . Therefore, for any EPE σ∗ of µ, there exists f ≡ f¯◦α ∈ F
with g ◦ σ∗ = f , i.e., (ii) of ex-post implementation holds as well.
B.8 Proof of Theorem 6
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) constructed in section A.2.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 5, for any f ∈ F , σfi (θi) = (0, f, θi, xi, 0) for both
i ∈ {1, 2} (with arbitrary xi ∈ X¯) is an EPE of µ such that f = g ◦ σf . That is, for any
f ∈ F , there exists an EPE, σf , of µ such that f = g ◦ σf , which implies that condition
(i) of Definition 2 (ex-post implementability) holds.
Consider an EPE σ∗ of µ represented by σ∗(θi) = (ni(θi), fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)).
For any f ∈ F and i ∈ N , let Θ¯fi := {θi ∈ Θi|ni(θ) = 0, fi(θi) = f} for i ∈ {1, 2}. That
is, Θ¯fi ⊂ Θ¯i is the set of types of individual i ∈ {1, 2} where the first entry of his/her
message—his/her proposed SCF—is f under σ∗. Let Θ¯f := ×i∈NΘ¯fi . That is, Θ¯f is
the set of states where both individuals propose the SCF f ∈ F under σ∗. Consider
the collection of product sets {Θ¯f}f∈F . Observe that Θ¯ :=
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f is the set of states
where Rule 1 applies under σ∗.
Hence, at any θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, either one of Rule 2.1, Rule 2.2, Rule 3 or Rule 4 applies
under σ∗. For each of these rules, consider the corresponding opportunity sets under µ:
If Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies at θ, then the opportunity set of the individual i, whose
message’s first entry is 1, equals Si(f, αj(θj)), where αj(θj) denotes the reported type of
j at θ, while the opportunity set of the individual j, whose message’s first entry is 0, is
X¯, i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Thus, if Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies at θ under σ∗, we must
have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (T ) for some T = Si(f, αj(θj)) ∈ Si and g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθj (X¯). By (iv)
of consistency-unanimity, there exists f ∗ ∈ F with T ∈ Si such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ)
whenever Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies at θ.
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If Rule 3 applies at θ, then, as was shown in the proof of Theorem 5, the opportunity
sets of individuals i and j are Si(f, αj(θj)) and Sj(f
′, αi(θi)), where f ′ ∈ F and f ∈ F
with f 6= f ′ are reported SCFs and αi(θi) and αj(θj) are the reported types at θ in the
messages of i and j, respectively, i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Thus, if Rule 3 applies at some θ
under σ∗, we must have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, αj(θj))) and g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθj (Sj(f ′, αi(θi))).
Thus, by (iv) of consistency-unanimity, there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ)
when Rule 3 applies at θ.
Finally, whenever Rule 4 applies at θ, the opportunity sets of individuals 1 and 2
under our mechanism are both equal to X¯. Therefore, if Rule 4 applies at θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯
under σ∗, then g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (X¯) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. By (iv) of consistency-unanimity,
there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) whenever Rule 4 applies at θ as well.
To sum up, there exists f ∗ ⊂ F such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for every θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯.
Next, we show that it must also be that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ¯. Recall that
σ∗(θi) = (ni(θi), fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)), i ∈ {1, 2}: Suppose, for contradiction, that
there exists θ˜ ∈ Θ¯f for some f ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜). Since Rule 1 applies
at θ˜ under σ∗ and, hence, g(σ∗(θ˜)) = f(α(θ˜)), we have f(α(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜) where α is the
deception profile induced by σ∗. Therefore, by (v) of consistency-unanimity, there exists
θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f such that either f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f, α2(θ∗2))) or f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f, α1(θ∗1))).
Since θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f , we have fi(θ∗i ) = f for both i ∈ {1, 2}. That is, Rule 1 applies at
θ∗ and hence g(σ∗(θ∗)) = f(α(θ∗)). But then, as shown in the proof of Theorem
5, Oµ1 (σ
∗
2(θ
∗
2)) = S1(f, α2(θ
∗
2)) and O
µ
2 (σ
∗
1(θ
∗
1)) = S2(f, α1(θ
∗
1)). Therefore, f(α(θ
∗)) /∈
Cθ
∗
1 (O
µ
1 (σ
∗
2(θ
∗
2))) implies g(σ
∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (Oµ1 (σ∗2(θ∗2))) while f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (Oµ2 (σ∗1(θ∗1)))
implies g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (Oµ2 (σ∗1(θ∗1))). In both cases, σ∗ cannot be an EPE of µ, a
contradiction.
Therefore, g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ with f ∗ ∈ F . That is, condition (ii)
ex-post implementability (see Definition 2) holds as well.
B.9 Proof of Theorem 7
The proof is provided as a discussion right after Theorem 7.
C An Illustration of Sufficiency with Two Individuals
We show how one of our sufficiency results, Corollary 2, can be employed on an
example that is inspired from Masatlioglu and Ok (2014).
The individual choices of Alice and Bob in this section are as specified in Table 9. The
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states of the world regarding the individual choices are Θ = {(♦,♦), (♦, c), (c,♦), (c, c)}.
That is, ΘA = ΘB = {♦, c}, where type ♦ stands for not having a status-quo and type
c stands for status-quo being coal. We consider a social planner who wants to ex-post
implement the SCF f described in Table 10—a selection from the BR-optimal outcomes.
In what follows, we show that the collections SA := {SA(f,♦), SA(f, c)} and SB :=
{SB(f,♦), SB(f, c)}, specified below, satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of Corollary 2.
SA(f,♦) = {n, s}, SB(f,♦) = {n, s},
SA(f, c) = {c, n, s}, SB(f, c) = {c, n, s}.
Condition (i):
For θB = ♦, we must have f(♦,♦) ∈ C(♦,♦)A (SA(f,♦)) and f(c,♦) ∈ C(c,♦)A (SA(f,♦)).
Since f(♦,♦) = s, f(c,♦) = s and s ∈ C(♦,♦)A ({n, s}), s ∈ C(c,♦)A ({n, s}), this is satisfied
for SA(f,♦) = {n, s}.
For θB = c, we must have f(♦, c) ∈ C(♦,c)A (SA(f, c)) and f(c, c) ∈ C(c,c)A (SA(f, c)).
Since f(♦, c) = s, f(c, c) = n and s ∈ C(♦,c)A ({c, n, s}), n ∈ C(c,c)A ({c, n, s}), this is
satisfied for SA(f, c) = {c, n, s}.
For θA = ♦, we must have f(♦,♦) ∈ C(♦,♦)B (SB(f,♦)) and f(♦, c) ∈ C(♦,c)B (SB(f,♦)).
Since f(♦,♦) = s, f(♦, c) = s and s ∈ C(♦,♦)B ({n, s}), s ∈ C(♦,c)B ({n, s}), this is satisfied
for SB(f,♦) = {n, s}.
For θA = c, we must have f(c,♦) ∈ C(c,♦)B (SB(f, c)) and f(c, c) ∈ C(c,c)B (SB(f, c)).
Since f(c,♦) = s, f(c, c) = n and s ∈ C(c,♦)B ({c, n, s}), n ∈ C(c,c)B ({c, n, s}), this is
satisfied for SB(f, c) = {c, n, s}.
That is, f(θ′A, θB) ∈ C(θ
′
A,θB)
A (SA(f, θB)) for each θ
′
A ∈ {♦, c} while f(θA, θ′B) ∈
C
(θA,θ
′
B)
B (SB(f, θA)) for each θ
′
B ∈ {♦, c}, as desired.
Finally, since both n and s are in every set in the collections SA and SB we have
SA(f, θB) ∩ SB(f, θA) 6= ∅ for each θA, θB ∈ {♦, c} as well.
Therefore, condition (i) of Corollary 2 is satisfied by the collections SA and SB.
Condition (ii):
For any product set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ, we have to consider the individual choices of Alice and
Bob from X¯ and X¯; X¯ and SB(f,♦); X¯ and SB(f, c); SA(f,♦) and X¯; SA(f, c) and
X¯; SA(f,♦) and SB(f,♦); SA(f,♦) and SB(f, c); SA(f, c) and SB(f,♦); SA(f, c) and
SB(f, c) at every state of the world in Θ \ Θ¯, i.e., outside of Θ¯.
Since
⋃
S∈SA∪ SB S ⊆ X¯, we must have X¯ = {c, n, s}. Furthermore, SA(f, c) =
SB(f, c) = {c, n, s} = X¯.
Therefore, for any product set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ, it is enough to check Alice’s choices from
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{c, n, s} and Bob’s choices from {c, n, s}; Alice’s choices from {c, n, s} and Bob’s choices
from {n, s}; Alice’s choices from {n, s} and Bob’s choices from {c, n, s} at every state
of the world in Θ \ Θ¯.
Below, we show that f satisfies choice unanimity whenever the individual choices
from the aforementioned sets overlap at any state of the world. This means condition
(ii) is satisfied for any subset of Θ, in particular, for any product set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ, as desired.
{c, n, s} for Alice, {c, n, s} for Bob: Alice’s and Bob’s choices overlap at (♦,♦) and
(c, c) with s ∈ C(♦,♦)A ({c, n, s})∩C(♦,♦)B ({c, n, s}) and n ∈ C(c,c)A ({c, n, s})∩C(c,c)B ({c, n, s}).
Since f(♦,♦) = s and f(c, c) = n, choice unanimity for these particular sets is satisfied
at every state of the world.
{c, n, s} for Alice, {n, s} for Bob: Alice’s and Bob’s choices overlap at (♦,♦) and
(♦, c) and (c, c) with s ∈ C(♦,♦)A ({c, n, s}) ∩ C(♦,♦)B ({n, s}) and s ∈ C(♦,c)A ({c, n, s}) ∩
C
(♦,c)
B ({n, s}) and n ∈ C(c,c)A ({c, n, s})∩C(c,c)B ({n, s}). Since f(♦,♦) = s and f(♦, c) = s
and f(c, c) = n, choice unanimity for these particular sets is also satisfied at every state
of the world.
{n, s} for Alice, {c, n, s} for Bob: Alice’s and Bob’s choices overlap at (♦,♦) and
(c,♦) and (c, c) with s ∈ C(♦,♦)A ({n, s}) ∩ C(♦,♦)B ({c, n, s}) and s ∈ C(c,♦)A ({n, s}) ∩
C
(c,♦)
B ({c, n, s})and n ∈ C(c,c)A ({n, s})∩C(c,c)B ({c, n, s}). Since f(♦,♦) = s and f(c,♦) = s
and f(c, c) = n, choice unanimity for these particular sets is satisfied at every state of
the world as well.
Therefore, condition (ii) of Corollary 2 is also satisfied by the collections SA and SB.
Condition (iii):
For any Θ¯ ⊂ Θ, we show that if f(α(θ)) 6= f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯, then θ∗ = θ ∈ Θ¯
works as the informant state by a case by case analysis:
If f(α(θ)) 6= f(θ), then (at least) one of the following must be true: (1) θ = (♦,♦) and
hence f(α(♦,♦)) 6= f(♦,♦); (2) θ = (♦, c) and hence f(α(♦, c)) 6= f(♦, c); (3) θ = (c,♦)
and hence f(α(c,♦)) 6= f(c,♦); or (4) θ = (c, c) and hence f(α(c, c)) 6= f(c, c).
Case 1: If θ = (♦,♦), i.e., f(α(♦,♦)) 6= f(♦,♦): Then, f(α(♦,♦)) = n. Hence, we
must have αA(♦) = αB(♦) = c. Then, θ∗ = θ = (♦,♦) and i∗ = A work since
SA(f, α(θB)) = SA(f, c) = {c, n, s} and n /∈ C(♦,♦)A ({c, n, s}).
Case 2: If θ = (♦, c), i.e., f(α(♦, c)) 6= f(♦, c): Then, f(α(♦, c)) = n. Hence, we
must have αA(♦) = c and αB(c) = c. Then, θ∗ = θ = (♦, c) and i∗ = A work since
SA(f, α(θB)) = SA(f, c) = {c, n, s} and n /∈ C(♦,c)A ({c, n, s}).
Case 3: If θ = (c,♦), i.e., f(α(c,♦)) 6= f(c,♦): Then, f(α(c,♦)) = n. Hence, we
must have αA(c) = c and αB(♦) = c. Then, θ∗ = θ = (c,♦) and i∗ = B work since
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SB(f, α(θA)) = SB(f, c) = {c, n, s} and n /∈ C(c,♦)B ({c, n, s}).
Case 4: If θ = (c, c), i.e., f(α(c, c)) 6= f(c, c): Then, f(α(c, c)) = s. Hence, we must
have either αA(c) = ♦ or αB(c) = ♦, or both. We consider each of these three cases
separately:
Subcase 4.1: If αA(c) = ♦ and αB(c) = c: Then, θ∗ = θ = (c, c) and i∗ = A work
since SA(f, α(θB)) = SA(f, c) = {c, n, s} and s /∈ C(c,c)A ({c, n, s}).
Subcase 4.2: If αA(c) = c and αB(c) = ♦: Then, θ∗ = θ = (c, c) and i∗ = B work
since SB(f, α(θA)) = SB(f, c) = {c, n, s} and s /∈ C(c,c)B ({c, n, s}).
Subcase 4.3: If αA(c) = ♦ and αB(c) = ♦: Then, θ∗ = θ = (c, c) and i∗ = A work
since SA(f, α(θB)) = SA(f,♦) = {n, s} and s /∈ C(c,c)A ({n, s}).
Therefore, SA and SB satisfy condition (iii) of Corollary 2 as well.
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